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Summary of Thesis 
Recent events of natural gas supply disruption in Europe have led to severe 
consequences of supply shortages to some European Member States. As the United 
Kingdom increasingly depend on imported gas supply from different sources including 
Continental Europe, the effect of gas supply disruption in Europe on UK’s gas 
consumers is in question.   This thesis investigated the effect of gas supply disruptions 
in Europe on the operation of the Great Britain’s gas and electricity network using a 
set of modelling tools.  
 
 An optimisation model of the European gas network was developed to assess the 
resilience of the European gas network to the loss of gas supply through the Ukraine 
transit pipelines to Europe.  The results showed that unserved gas demand occurred in 
South East Europe. It was shown that additional interconnector capacities of selected 
pipelines and higher storage withdrawal rate in South East Europe minimised unserved 
gas demand in South East Europe. 
 
A soft-link coupling of the European Gas Network model (EGN) and the Combined 
Gas and Electricity Network model (CGEN) was developed and used to examine the 
effect of a 90-day loss of Ukraine transit capacity in Europe on the operation of GB 
gas and electricity network at a period of limited LNG supply to Europe. The result 
showed that in a high gas demand situation, industrial customers would experience 
some amount of unserved gas demand. 
 
The effectiveness of the mitigation options to prevent or mitigate unserved gas in GB 
was analysed using the EGN-CGEN model. Then a cost-benefit assessment tool was 
used to rank the mitigation options according to the net benefit of reducing the cost of 
unserved gas demand in GB. It was shown that diversification of gas supply sources 
and routes in Europe would deliver significant security of supply benefit to GB gas 
and electricity network. 
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Chapter 1  
1.Introduction 
1.1 Global Natural Gas Outlook 
According to the world energy outlook, natural gas demand is projected to increase 
from 3.3 tcm in 2010 to 4.9 tcm in 2035 [1]. The strongest demand growth is expected 
to come from Asia where it is mainly driven by gas consumption in the industrial and 
electricity sectors [2].   Global gas supply is projected to increase at an average yearly 
rate of 1.75 % between 2012 and 2035 [3]. Significant contributors to the growth in 
gas production will be the North America, Eurasia and Middle East. Collectively, they 
will account for 61% of global gas production by 2035 [1]. In the European Union, 
natural gas production is projected to decline significantly by 43% in 2035 from 
current levels [4].  
Substantial growth in unconventional gas (shale gas and coal bed methane) production 
is expected to contribute significantly to future gas supply. Unconventional gas is 
natural gas sourced from different geological formations by means of horizontal 
drilling and fracturing. The United States is the largest producer of shale gas which 
accounted for 43% of total natural production in 2013[5]. Gas production in the United 
States (US) is projected to increase from 689 bcm in 2013 to 800 bcm in 2035 driven 
by significant development in shale gas production [1].   
 
Global gas demand and supply balance is achieved by means of inter–regional gas 
trade through pipeline supplies and Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) shipment. Pipeline 
transport accounts for 68% of global natural gas supplies [1]. Significant developments 
in the LNG supply chain is expected to take place in the period towards 2030 and LNG 
supplies are projected to increase by 62% in 2035 from 304 bcm in 2013[1]. 
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1.2 Natural Gas Development in Europe  
Natural gas is an important component of the European energy mix and accounted for 
about 22% of primary energy consumption in 2015 [6]. Natural gas is expected to play 
a significant role in achieving the climate and energy targets of the European Union 
(EU).  In comparison to oil and coal, natural gas emits less carbon dioxide during 
combustion and offers significant potential to reduce CO2 emissions in the power 
generation  
 
Access to secure, adequate and affordable gas supplies within Europe is an important 
goal of the EU [7]. At present, the level of access to secure gas supplies varies 
significantly across member states. Gas systems predominately in North-West Europe 
can receive natural gas from multiple supply sources, while gas systems in the Baltic 
region rely on a single source of supply [8]. Planned investment in cross-border gas 
infrastructure between member states is expected to increase the number of alternative 
gas supply routes across Europe in order to improve security of gas supply. 
 
In order to facilitate the operation and delivery of this interconnected European gas 
system, a Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) is published every two 
years by the European Network Transmission System Operators for Gas (ENSTOG) 
[9]. The TYNP provides an assessment of the European gas transmission network 
development and future scenarios of gas demand and supply to Europe. 
 
1.2.1 Evolution of European Natural Gas Demand  
Several scenarios have been developed to estimate the future projections of natural gas 
demand in Europe [10], [11]. Figure 1.1 depicts two different demand scenarios across   
EU gas consumption sectors: power generation, residential and commercial, industry, 
transport and others.  
 
 In the EU Energy Trends Scenario, the overall demand decreases by 24% in 2030 
relative to 2010.  This scenario assumes that long-term energy targets on energy 
efficiency, deployment of renewable energy technologies and other low carbon 
technologies are achieved in a timely manner. The Eurogas Scenario shows a demand 
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increase of 8.7% by 2030 over the same period. This scenario assumes that current 
national energy policies are maintained with limited future investment in the gas 
sectors. 
 
Figure 1.1. Comparison of European Union gas demand projections 
In both scenarios, gas demand for power generation steadily increases towards 2030. 
Gas-fired generators are expected to displace coal and oil generators from the EU 
electricity generation mix. In contrast, gas demand in the residential and commercial 
sector decreases considerably by 2030 in both scenarios. Natural gas is used for space 
heating and hot water in the domestic & commercial sector. The demand profile has a 
seasonal pattern of peak demand in winter months and low demand in summer months 
[12]. The demand reduction in this sector is driven by energy efficiency improvement 
in buildings and the deployment of renewable heat technologies such as heat pumps 
[10], [13]. 
 
The future outlook of gas demand in Europe will be influenced by other factors 
including benchmark carbon-price, cost of competing fuels, the deployment of carbon 
capture and storage at commercial scale (CCS), economic growth, environmental 
legislation and national energy policies of member states [14],[15]. 
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1.2.2 European Gas Supply Outlook 
European Union gas supply comes from indigenous production, LNG and pipeline 
imports from Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya. Historically, indigenous production, 
especially from the Netherlands and the United Kingdom, was the main source of gas 
supply in the EU [16]. As indigenous gas production declines, increasing reliance on 
imported gas supply is anticipated to meet future gas demand [17]. EU gas imports are 
projected to reach 85% of total supply by 2035 [1]. 
 
Table 1.1 Maximum gas supply scenarios to the European Union (bcm) [18] 
 
 2015 2020 2025 2030 2035 
Russia 174 194 198 201 212 
Norway 124 127 106 82 82 
Algeria 42 45 51 55 59 
Libya 11 11 11 11 11 
Azerbaijan 0 4 11 16 16 
Turkmenistan 0 33 26 28 37 
LNG 134 165 191 217 242 
 
Table 1.1 present the maximum gas supplies available to the EU from several sources.   
Russian gas supply to Europe increases by 22% (38 bcm) between 2015 and 2035. On 
the other hand, natural gas supply from Norway to Europe peaks at 127 bcm by 2020 
and then declines to 82 bcm by 2035. Potential gas supplies from Turkmenistan (in the 
Caspian region) to the EU is estimated to increase substantially to 36.6 bcm in 2035 
from current levels (Table 1.1). Presently, there is no gas pipeline connecting Europe 
to gas reserves in Turkmenistan. However, some pipeline projects are under 
consideration to address this limitation [9].   
 
LNG supplies to EU member states is sourced from several producing countries 
including Qatar, Algeria and Nigeria. Qatar is the highest LNG exporter to Europe 
with 47% share of LNG import in 2014[19]. The EU closely follows Asia as the second 
largest LNG supply destination in the global LNG market. Table 1.1 shows that LNG 
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import is projected to increase rapidly from 133.9 bcm in 2015 to 242.4 bcm in 2035 
exceeding Russian gas supply by 2030. 
1.3 Natural Gas Supply System  
Natural gas supply system involves the transportation of natural gas from production 
wells to the different end users. In Europe, the natural gas supply system consists of a 
complex pipeline network, liquefied natural gas terminal gas (LNG) terminals and gas 
storage facilities. 
 
1.3.1 Transmission Network 
Natural gas is transported from production fields through a network of transmission 
pipelines directly to distribution networks, large power stations and large industrial 
consumers. Domestic and commercial consumers are supplied through the low 
pressure distribution network. The gas transmission networks are characterised by high 
pressure (in excess of 40 bar) and long distance pipelines.  
 
In Europe, the Transmission System Operators (TSO) own and operate the 
transmission network. The TSO is responsible for balancing demand and supply, 
ensuring the reliable and safe operation of the network within the specified pressure 
limits [20].  The European gas transmission network comprises the natural gas 
transmission infrastructure of individual countries integrated as a single entity for 
delivery and transport of natural gas supplies across Europe. 
 
Compressor stations are installed along the long distance high pressure pipelines to 
maintain gas pressure in the network within acceptable limits. Compressor stations 
consist of a single or multiple compressor units driven by a gas turbine or an electric 
motor.  
 
In recent times, electricity driven compressor are preferred over gas turbine drivers as 
they offer lower maintenance, lower noise levels and no greenhouse gas emissions 
[21]. In Europe, 7000 MW compression capacity has been planned alongside pipeline 
projects to improve network capacity and security of supply [22].  
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1.3.2 Gas Storage  
Natural gas storage provides an important source of supply flexibility. Storage 
facilities function as a buffer capacity during periods of peak demand, seasonal 
demand variation or in the event of gas supply disruptions [23]. 
 
Underground storage facilities are classified according to four technical 
characteristics. These are cushion gas capacity, working gas capacity, withdrawal rate 
and injection rate [24]. The cushion gas capacity is the volume of gas retained in the 
reservoir to maintain adequate pressure in the facility. The working gas capacity is the 
volume of gas that can be withdrawn from or injected into a storage facility. The 
summation of the cushion case capacity and working gas capacity constitute the total 
gas storage capacity. The withdrawal rate refers to the rate at which natural gas can be 
extracted from a storage facility on a daily basis while injection rate is the rate at which 
gas molecules can be pumped into storage for future use.  
 
The three major types of underground storage facilities used in Europe are depleted 
oil/gas fields, aquifers and salt cavern. Table 1.2 presents the types of storage facilities 
classified by their key characteristics. Total gas storage capacity of existing storage 
facilities is 108.3 bcm [25].  Several development projects have been planned across 
the EU and if completed, will increase storage capacity by 20% in 2020 from current 
levels [22]. 
 
Table 1.2  Key characteristics of underground storage facilities [24] 
 
Storage Features Depleted Fields Aquifer Salt Cavern 
Main function Seasonal facility Seasonal facility Fast cycle facility 
Storage capacity Usually large 
capacity 
Large capacity Low capacity 
Cushion gas High cushion gas 
requirement 
High cushion 
gas requirement 
Low cushion gas 
requirement 
Withdrawal and 
Injection rates 
Low rates High rates High rates 
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Cost Low operating cost High operating 
cost 
High operating cost 
 
1.3.3 Liquefied Natural Gas Facilities  
Liquefied natural gas is natural gas cooled to its liquid state at a temperature of about 
-612oC and kept at high pressure [16]. The volume of LNG is greatly reduced to about 
600 times less than the volume of its gaseous form. Natural gas is converted to LNG 
at liquefaction terminals. After production, LNG is transported by specially designed 
ships (LNG tankers) to regasification terminals located at LNG importing countries. 
For long distance gas transport beyond 3000-5000km, large LNG shipment shows 
favourable economic justification compared to pipeline capacity [26]. At the 
regasification terminal, LNG is transformed into its gaseous state (regasified) and 
discharged into pipelines connected to the transmission network. LNG regasification 
terminals are spread across the coastlines of South and Northwest European countries.  
In 2015, the total existing LNG regasification capacity among EU member states was 
198 bcm/y [16].  
 
1.4 Interaction between European Gas Supply and GB Gas and 
Electricity Networks  
The European gas transmission network comprises the natural gas transmission 
infrastructure of individual countries integrated as a single entity for delivery and 
transport of natural gas supplies across Europe. Great Britain’s (GB) natural gas 
network is connected to the European gas network via six undersea pipelines linked to 
Norway, Belgium and the Netherlands.  Norwegian gas is delivered via Langled 
pipeline to Easington terminal while Vesterled, Tampen & Gjoa gas pipelines link with 
St. Fergus terminal in Scotland. Also, the BBL pipelines (Balgzand Bacton Line) from 
Netherland and Interconnector pipeline (IUK) from Belgium come ashore at the 
Bacton gas terminal. Total import capacity from Norway and continental Europe is 
presently about 46.6bcm/y which is 1/3 of UK’s import capacity [27]. 
 
Historically, GB was a major producer and exporter of natural gas. Since 2004, the 
decline in domestic gas production led to increasing reliance on gas import to meet its 
Chapter 1                                                                                              Introduction  
 
 
 
8 
 
  
domestic gas demand. Thus, GB’s import infrastructure has increased in relation to 
peak demand and they are more diversified to receive supply from various sources 
including LNG. Total capacity of existing LNG regasification terminals is 53.1 bcm/y 
[27]. 
 
Whilst the current level of GB’s import capacity is understood to be relatively robust, 
there is increasing uncertainty about how future supply patterns will develop.  Gas 
supply to GB is influenced by a number of external factors including the evolution of 
the global LNG market and developments in the European gas network. There is 
increasing competition in the global LNG market as more countries in Europe and in 
other parts of the world expand their regasification capacities [28]. In a tight LNG 
market (i.e. when demand exceeds supply), GB may not attract sufficient LNG 
supplies at prices acceptable to its gas consumers.  
 
At the same time, continental gas supplies to the GB network is determined by the 
demand and supply situation in mainland Europe. In 2009, the disruption of Russian 
gas supplies through Ukraine to Europe led to higher gas spot prices. During this 
period, increased gas export from GB to the continent on the cross-border 
interconnector between GB and Belgium  occurred due to higher gas prices on the 
continent [29]. During the crisis, Norwegian gas supplies to continental Europe 
increased, this resulted in less gas export from Norway to GB [30].   
    
GB is committed to increasing the share of renewable generation in electricity 
generation mix.  48 GW of wind generation capacity would be connected to the 
electricity network by 2030 [31].  Wind power is variable and requires other flexible 
generators to ramp up and down to balance electricity demand. Gas-fired plants have 
the capability to rapidly adjust their output power and complement the variable 
generation from renewable energy sources such as wind.  
 
The GB natural gas network is coupled to the GB electricity network through gas-fired 
plants. Currently, installed capacity of gas-fired plants accounts for 34% of GB 
generation mix [32]. In the period between 2013- 2025, gas generation capacity is 
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expected to increase by 32% [32]. In contrast, coal generation capacity will decline to 
comply with the Large Combustion Plant Directive (LCPD).  
 
The increasing interdependency of both network have implications for security of 
supply. The electricity network will increasing depend on imported gas supplies to 
meet gas demand in power generation. An interruption in the gas supplies could lead 
to additional stress on the power system and loss of power supply.  
 
Given the growing interdependency between the gas and electricity network and the 
increasing reliance on gas import, it is essential that the security of GB gas and 
electricity networks is assessed in relation to European gas supply situations. 
 
1.5 Thesis Objectives 
The objectives of the research described in this thesis were to: 
 Develop an optimisation model of the European gas network to determine gas 
flows on cross border interconnectors and utilisation of storage facilities and 
LNG terminals across Europe.  
 Investigate the impact of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity on operation of 
the European gas network for two demand scenarios in 2015.   
 Assess the resilience of the GB gas and electricity networks to a potential loss 
of the Ukraine transit capacity during a period limited LNG availability to 
Europe in 2030. 
 Assess the role of mitigation options to improve the security of gas supply to 
GB. 
 
1.6 Contributions of this thesis 
 Developed a linear optimisation algorithm of the European gas supply system 
to examine gas flows in Europe.  
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 Investigated the impact of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity on the European 
gas supply system. Locations and volume of unserved gas demand were 
identified and mitigation measures were modelled. 
 A soft-link approach was used to integrate a detailed technical model of the 
GB gas and electricity networks to a simplified model of the European gas 
network.  
  The soft-linked model was used to examine the impact of the loss of Ukraine 
transit capacity on the operation of GB gas and electricity networks during a 
period of limited LNG supply to Europe in 2030. 
  A set of six mitigation options were identified and analysed to improve 
security of gas supply to GB using the soft-linked model. A cost-benefit 
assessment of the mitigation options was conducted. 
 
1.7 Thesis outline 
This thesis has six chapters. 
Chapter 2 presents a review of natural gas systems models and security of gas supply. 
The key features of security of supply with relevance to natural gas are described. 
Security of supply challenges in Europe are highlighted and security of supply 
measures are outlined. The types of gas network models used in studies to address 
security of supply issues are presented. The chapter ends with a review of gas and 
electricity system modelling techniques and their applications.    
    
Chapter 3 outlines the simplification of the European gas network and the development 
of a simplified European gas model in Fico Xpress optimisation suite software.  A 
detailed description of the optimisation model is provided including the mathematical 
formulation (Figure 1.2). In this chapter, the European Gas Network (EGN) model was 
used to conduct a study of the impact of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity on Russian 
gas supply to Europe for a high gas demand case and a low gas demand case in 2015. 
The capability of the European gas network to cope with the supply shortage was 
analysed and locations of unserved gas demand were identified.   
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In chapter 4, a soft-link methodology is used to couple the European Gas Network 
(EGN) model with the Combined Gas and Electricity Network (CGEN) model. Firstly, 
the features of the CGEN model are described including its network components. The 
stages involved in soft-linking the European gas network model and CGEN are 
presented. The integrated EGN-CGEN model is used to examine the effect of the loss 
of Ukraine transit capacity in Europe on the operation of GB gas and electricity 
networks during a period of limited LNG availability to Europe over 90 days of winter 
(Figure 1.2).  
 
Chapter 5 presents the modelling of six mitigation options to improve physical security 
of gas supply in GB. The effectiveness of the mitigation options in reducing or 
eliminating unserved gas demand in GB was investigated using the EGN-CGEN 
model. Then a cost-benefit assessment of the six mitigation options was conducted as 
shown in Figure 1.2.  
 
Chapter 6 presents the conclusions of the main findings and recommendations for 
future work. 
 
 
 
Figure 1.2. Structure of the Integrated EGN-CGEN model and the thesis outline    
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Chapter 2  
2.Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction 
Security of gas supply is a primary concern of the European Union. These concerns 
relate to gas import dependence and the risk of gas supply disruptions. The EU have 
identified key gas infrastructure investments required to upgrade the existing European 
gas network and improve security of gas supply.   
 
Gas networks and electricity networks are interconnected by gas-fired generators. By 
2030, gas-fired generation is expected to complement a large penetration of variable 
renewable generation in Europe due to its flexible operational characteristics.  Gas-
fired generators possess short start-up time and high ramp rate best suited to respond 
to fast changes in renewable generation output. The growing use of gas-fired 
generators in electricity generation leads to greater interdependence between the gas 
and electricity networks. The availability of reliable and secure gas supply becomes 
increasingly important to the operation of both networks. 
 
A holistic approach to these issues requires the development of a suitable modelling 
tool to assess the security of gas supply risks on the gas network and its impact on the 
electricity network. This chapter presents a literature review of the security of gas 
supply in Europe, the development of models used to analyse natural gas systems and 
the interdependence between gas and electricity systems.  
 
2.2 Security of Gas Supply in Europe 
According to the IEA, security of gas supply is defined as the uninterrupted availability 
of natural gas at an affordable price [33]. Historical events of gas supply disruption to 
Europe have highlighted challenges in the regional approach to security of gas supply 
across the 28 different member states. In order to address these problems, the EU has 
adopted appropriate directive and regulations to improve security of gas supply. It is 
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expected that these policy actions will drive investment in gas infrastructure projects 
that would enhance the resilience of the European transmission network against gas 
supply risks [34]. 
 
2.2.1 Gas Supply and Import Dependency in Europe  
The domestic gas production in Europe has decreased from 258 bcm in 2000 to 163 
bcm in 2013 [35],[36]. As Europe’s domestic gas production continue to decline, EU 
member states would increasingly rely on imported gas supply from various LNG 
sources, Russia, Norway, Algeria and Libya.  Figure 2.1 illustrates the levels of import 
dependence across EU countries in 2014.  
 
Figure 2.1. Import dependence among EU countries in 2014 [37] Error! Reference s
ource not found. 
In Figure 2.1, only two countries (Denmark and Netherlands) use domestic gas 
production to meet gas demand [38]. About 13 countries have 100% import 
dependency, some of which are solely reliant on Russian gas supply through a few 
transit routes. In 2014, the aggregated level of gas import in the EU was 66%. 
 
2.2.2 Security of Gas Supply Challenges in Europe  
The impact of gas supply disruption on EU member states depends on the level of 
reliance on gas imports, duration of the supply crisis, the volume of lost gas supplies 
and availability of alternative supply options. The risks of security of gas supply in 
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Europe arise from political and technical challenges. Three cases of gas supply 
disruption in Europe and the mitigating actions taken at the EU level to address these 
challenges are discussed in this subsection. 
 
 Political 
The most prominent threat of supply disruption in Europe has been the geopolitical/ 
gas price dispute between Russia and Ukraine. In January 2009, Russia shut off gas 
supplies through Ukraine, which resulted in a supply shortage of about 300mcm/d to 
12 EU member states for two weeks [39]. A wide range of gas emergency measures 
were utilised in the affected countries to mitigate the impact of the supply shortage 
[40].  Most countries relied on gas withdrawn from storage facilities,  imported gas 
from alternative suppliers and LNG import to replace the lost gas volumes.  In other 
cases, the supply shortage was compensated by  switching to fuel oil and coal for 
heating and electricity generation especially in countries with limited access to other   
gas supply sources [39]. This gas supply crisis highlighted the need for a robust 
European gas transmission system that can adequately cope with various gas supply 
and demand patterns.  
 
In 2011, political instability in Libya resulted in a loss of Libyan gas export to Europe 
for a duration of 8 months between February and October [41]. The supply disruption 
resulted in a supply shortfall of 25 mcm/d in Italy on the single pipeline, which 
connects Libya to Europe. This loss, representing about 10% of Italian gas 
consumption was replaced by higher LNG import and pipeline import from Austria. 
This availability of LNG supply limited the impact of gas supply disruption on gas 
consumers Italy and Europe. 
 
 Technical 
In January 2010, a technical problem in Norwegian Kroll  gas field led to significant 
decline of 250 mcm of Norwegian pipeline supply to the UK over a four-day period 
[42]. The supply shortage occurred during a period of very high gas demand due to a 
severely cold winter. The lost gas volume was replaced by higher LNG import and 
European pipeline import and lower gas consumption in industry and power generation 
(demand-side response).   
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The cases of gas supply disruption in Europe highlight the limited capability of the 
European transmission system to cope with a major gas supply crisis. Some of the 
inherent system challenges include insufficient interconnector capacities between 
member state gas networks and limited diversification of imported supply sources and 
routes.   
 
2.2.3 Strategies for Diversification of Gas Import Routes  
Figure 2.2 shows the level of import route diversification among EU member states. 
Import Route Diversification (IRD) index is used to evaluate the ability of a country 
to diversify its gas supply entry points based on the  gas import capacity of the given 
country [9]. 
Figure 2.2 Level of import route diversification among EU member states [9] 
The countries denoted by the blue colour have well-diversified gas import capacity. 
All countries in North West Europe are shown to have a well-diversified import 
capacity except the Republic of Ireland.  On the other hand, countries denoted by the 
yellow colour have the least diversified gas import capacity and they are mainly 
located in the Balkan and Baltic regions. The three main strategies for improving 
import route diversification are: bi-directional flow capability on interconnectors, 
additional gas interconnection and improved LNG infrastructure. 
 
 
 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                     Literature Review    
 
 
 
16 
 
  
 Bi-directional flow capability on gas interconnectors 
Since 2009, a number of pipeline projects have implemented bi-directional flow 
capacity on cross-border interconnectors in Central and Eastern Europe to eliminate 
flow restrictions and improve the integration of gas networks in these regions. Bi-
directional flow capability enables the transportation of gas through pipelines in both 
directions. Completed pipeline projects with bi-directional flow capabilities include 
the interconnector between Poland and Czech Republic and the interconnector  
between Germany and Poland [34]. These pipeline projects enable countries in South 
East Europe to have unrestricted access to gas supplies in North West Europe.   
 
 Additional gas interconnections 
Several pipeline projects have been proposed and even completed to bypass transit 
countries along import routes and bring new gas volumes to Europe. Examples of 
import pipeline projects include the Nord Stream 2 pipeline and the Trans Adriatic 
Pipeline (TAP). The Nord Stream pipeline 2 has a planned capacity of 55 bcm per 
annum [43]. The proposed project is expected to bring Russian gas supply through 
Germany to Europe in order to avoid gas transport through transit countries such as 
Ukraine and Belarus.  The TAP pipeline would deliver Caspian gas supplies through 
Turkey to South East Europe. The pipeline has an initial capacity of 10 bcm annually 
and it is routed through Albania to cross the Adriatic Sea into Southern Italy. If 
completed, the project will contribute to reducing the reliance on Russian gas supply 
in South East Europe [44].  
 
 Improved LNG infrastructure 
LNG supplies provide a key alternative to pipeline import as a means to diversify gas 
supply and improve security of gas supplies in the EU [45]. The newly constructed 
Klaipeda LNG regasification terminal in Lithuania has a maximum import capacity of 
4 bcm annually [46].  This LNG import terminal provides another supply source for 
countries in Baltic region to reduce their dependence on Russian gas supply. In 2015, 
LNG supplies of 50 mcm accounted for 21% of total gas consumption in Lithuania 
[11].  Additional LNG regasification projects have been planned in France, Croatia, 
Italy and Netherlands. Currently planned EU LNG projects will increase current 
annual LNG import capacity of 198 bcm to 234 bcm by 2020 [47]. 
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2.2.4 Security of Gas Supply Regulation 
In 2010, the European Union established the regulation on security of supply (EU 
994/2010) in response to the January 2009 Russia-Ukraine gas crisis [48].  This 
regulation introduced a set of common standards to help prevent and mitigate the 
impact of a supply disruption if it occurs. These common standards include security of 
supply standards, national risk assessment and emergency plans as well as regional 
coordination of security of supply measures.  
 
 Security of supply standard 
The security of supply standard requires that on a day of exceptionally high demand, 
all EU countries have adequate capacity to meet their total gas demand in the event of 
an outage of the single largest gas infrastructure. This requirement can be fulfilled 
through both regional and national infrastructure capacity. In addition, gas suppliers 
must ensure that protected (domestic) customers are supplied in severe conditions 
including seven consecutive days of peak demand and 30 days of high demand 
situations. These supply criteria must be fulfilled in the event of the loss of a gas 
infrastructure on a normal winter day.  
 
 Risk assessments and emergency plans 
The security of supply regulation requires that EU countries conduct a risk assessment 
to identify potential risks to securing gas supply and examine the adequacy of the 
existing gas infrastructure to cope in the event of various scenarios of supply 
disruptions under different demand conditions. The risk assessment must include EU 
supply standards and interaction with gas networks of other EU countries. In addition, 
national regulation authorities are obliged to prepare preventive actions and emergency 
actions that remove or mitigate the identified risks.  These plans should be updated 
every 2 years. 
 
 Regional coordination  
Regional coordination in the implementation of security of supply measures is a key 
priority of the European Union. EU member states are segmented into regions for 
detailed assessment of location specific challenges and proposed solutions toward gas 
supply security. This regional approach is expected to improve cooperation between 
Chapter 2                                                                                                                     Literature Review    
 
 
 
18 
 
  
member states in effective prevention and mitigation of potential gas supply risks. It 
also aims to reduce the cost of improving security of supply to EU consumers and 
increases solidarity among member states in the case of a gas supply disruption 
 
2.3 Gas Network Models  
Gas network models are mathematical representations used to describe gas flow in gas 
networks [49]. Major parameters considered in the development of gas network 
models include flow rate, pressure, pipe length, pipe diameter, suction pressure and 
discharge pressure of compressor stations. These parameters are used for the design, 
operation and planning of gas networks.  
 
A simple gas network is presented in Figure 2.3. The network is comprised of nodes 
and arcs. The capacities and pressures of the supply point, demand points and 
compressor station are represented by nodes while the arcs represent the pipeline flow 
rates determined from pipe lengths and diameters. The relationship between pressure 
and flow in pipelines and compressor stations are described by non-linear equations. 
Figure 2.3 A simple gas network structure 
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2.3.1 Fundamental Gas Flow Equation  
The flow rate of gas moving along pipelines is determined by  physical dimensions of 
the pipeline, properties of gas and  the pressure drop across the pipeline [21]. The 
general flow equation for steady state gas flow in horizontal pipelines is given by [50]: 
 
𝑄𝑛 = ∁
𝑇𝑛
𝑃𝑛
√
(𝑃1
2 − 𝑃2
2)𝐷5
𝑓𝑆𝐿𝑇𝑍
 
 
2.1 
 
where 𝑄𝑛 is gas flow at standard condition (m
3/d), ∁ is constant, 𝑇𝑛 is temperature at 
standard condition (288 K), 𝑃𝑛 is pressure at standard condition (0.01 MPa), 𝑃1 is gas 
pressure at inlet of the pipe, 𝑃2 is pressure at outlet of the pipe, 𝐷 is internal diameter 
of the pipe, 𝑓 is friction factor, 𝑆 is gas specific gravity, 𝐿 is pipe length, 𝑇 is gas 
temperature, 𝑍 is compressibility factor. 
 
The derivation of Equation 2.1 is based on the following assumptions: 
 Gas flow in steady state condition 
 Kinetic energy changes along the pipeline is negligible  
 Gas flow through pipeline is constant temperature due to heat exchange with 
the surrounding through the pipe wall 
 Constant compressibility and friction factor along the pipeline. 
The friction factor is used to determine pressure loss in gas flow due to friction with 
the wall of the pipeline. The calculation of pressure loss in transmission networks is 
required to determine the capacity of compressors and the location of compressors 
stations along the long distance pipelines. 
 
For high pressure gas flow, friction factor is a function of the Reynold number and 
pipe roughness as given by Equations 2.2 and 2.3 [50]. 
 
 
√
1
𝑓
= 4𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑅𝑒√𝑓 − 0.6 
2.2 
where Re is the Reynold number.  
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The Reynold number is a dimensionless value used to classify gas flow as laminar 
flow and turbulent flow. Laminar flow occurs when the Reynold number is less than 
2000 while turbulent flow is observed as the Reynold number exceeding 2000 [50].   
 
 
√
1
𝑓
= 4𝑙𝑜𝑔 (3.7 
𝐷
𝑘
) 
2.3 
 where D is the internal diameter of the pipe and k is the roughness of the pipe wall. 
Gas flow through high pressure transmission pipelines are classified as turbulent flow. 
 
2.3.2 Types of Gas Networks Models  
There are two methods used in the modelling of gas networks. These are numerical or 
simulation methods and optimisation methods [50].  
 
Simulation models are used to study the behaviour of the gas network under a given 
condition. The simulation approach involves the calculation of nodal pressures and the 
flow rates on individual pipelines by solution methods that require several complex 
iterations [50],[51].  Many studies have developed numerical models to examine the 
operation of gas network. In [52] a discretization method based on the finite element 
scheme was used to handle the partial differential equations in transient analysis of gas 
networks. A comparison of isothermal and non-isothermal transient gas network 
model was presented in [53].   
 
Optimisation models are used to determine the best solution to a gas network problem 
among a set of feasible solutions subject to a given set of constraints [54].  
Optimisation models consist of decision variables, constraints and an objective 
function.  Decision variables are elements of the gas network model whose values are 
to be determined from the optimal solution e.g. gas flow rate through pipelines and 
compressor stations [54].  
 
Constraints are equality or inequality equations used to restrict the values assigned to 
the decision variable. For example, gas flow through pipeline is constrained by the 
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maximum technical capacity of the pipeline [54]. The objective function is the 
quantitative component of the gas network model expressed as a function of the 
decision variables which is maximised or minimised e.g. minimisation of operational 
cost or maximisation of gas flows [55].  
 
Optimisation models are used in the literature to address various natural gas 
transmission network challenges such as; how to design a new network, expansion of 
existing networks and the minimisation of gas supply cost and the cost of fuel 
consumed in compressor stations.  
 
A major difference between the optimisation models and numerical simulations is that 
an optimal solution is always achieved in a single optimisation run.  
 
2.3.3 Types of Optimisation Methods used in Gas Network 
Modelling 
Optimisation methods have been used extensively in the literature to develop gas 
network models. These methods are broadly classified as Linear Programming (LP), 
Non-Linear Programming (NLP), Mixed Integer Programing (MILP) and Mixed 
Integer Non-linear Programing (MINLP) optimisation.  
 
 Linear optimisation model  
Linear programming (also known as linear optimisation) (LP) is used to formulate and 
solve mathematical models represented by linear equality or inequality constraints and 
linear objective functions [55].   
The standard form of the problem is presented below:  
 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑇𝑥 2.4 
 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜  𝐴𝑥 ≤ 𝑏 2.5 
 
  𝑥 ≥ 0 2.6 
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where 𝐶𝑇 is transpose matrix of a known coefficient,  𝑥 is a non-negative vector, A is 
a known matrix of coefficients and 𝑏 is a known coefficient. The goal of this LP 
problem is to minimize the objective function.   
 
Linear optimisation models have been implemented for wide range of gas network 
studies.  In [56], a gas network model was developed using the linear optimisation. 
The model considered demands, supply capacities at different entry nodes, mass 
balance at each node and the flow capacities of the pipelines. However, the pipeline 
pressures were not considered. The model was used to optimise natural gas dispatch 
within the network.  The study in  [57] presented  an LP  model to minimise the gas 
supply cost including production cost, pipeline transportation cost, LNG regasification 
cost and storage operation cost in the gas network. Similarly, in [58]  a linear 
optimisation model was used  to project future gas supply to Europe by 2030, in order 
to minimise the total investment and operating cost of gas production and supply of 
the network.  
 
 Non-linear optimisation in gas networks  
The non-linear programming optimisation problem is formulated as a set of non- linear 
constraints and/or a non-linear objective function. Examples of the application of non-
linear optimisation to gas network gas problems include fuel cost minimisation, 
minimum operational cost in gas networks and optimal dimension of gas pipelines.  
An example of a non-linear optimisation problem is given by: 
 𝑀𝑖𝑛 𝐶𝑇𝑥 2.7 
 
 𝑆𝑢𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑡𝑜  𝐴𝑥2  ≤ 𝑏 2.8 
 
 𝑥 ≥ 0 2.9 
where 𝐶𝑇, 𝐴 , 𝑏 are parameters and 𝑥 is the decision variable. The objective function 
is presented in Equation 2.7. The non-linear constraint is given by Equation 2.8 and 
the Equation 2.9 shows the non-negative constraint on the decision variable. 
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 Several algorithms have been developed to solve different types of non-linear 
optimisation problems in gas networks. Some examples include linearization approach 
[59],  dynamic programming[60], and heuristic methods [61].  
 
The work done in [62] involved the formulation of  a gas transmission network model 
to minimise total supply cost subject to linear and non-linear constraints.  A piece-wise 
linear approximation approach was used to handle the non-linearity of gas flow 
equation and a simplex algorithm extension was applied to solve the relaxed model. In 
[63] a non-linear gas network model was presented  to minimise the total fuel cost of 
the compressor stations in the network. The non-linearity of gas flow through pipes, 
pressure limits at each node and compressor stations were modelled as a set of non-
linear constraints.  A lower bound scheme was used to relax the non-linear cost 
function and obtain an optimal solution.  
 
A dynamic programming algorithm was proposed by [64] for minimising the cost of 
fuel consumption in compressors stations within the gas network subject to non-linear 
flow-pressure constraints. The model included a representation of bi-directional gas 
flows in pipelines, operation of compressor stations and gas stored in pipelines 
(linepack). The solution method was shown to achieve global optimality when applied 
to cyclic gas network configuration. The study in [61] presented a heuristic method to 
minimise fuel costs in a gas transmission network. A two-stage iterative solution 
approach was applied to a non-linear optimisation model.  In the first stage, the flow 
variable was fixed while the pressure variable was optimised by dynamic 
programming. In the second stage, the pressure variable is fixed while the optimal flow 
variable is calculated. 
  
 Other optimisation models 
Mixed integer linear programming and mixed integer non-linear programming models 
are also regarded as variants of linear and non-linear programming models. The key 
feature that differentiates the MILP and MINLP models from other models is that 
discrete variables (0,1) are included in the model formulation.  
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 In relevant literature,  a mixed integer non-linear gas network model was formulated  
to minimise the cost of fuel consumed by compressors [65]. A piece-wise linear 
algorithm was used to linearize the non-linear constraints and solve the model. In  [66] 
a MILP model was presented to optimise the scheduling of a set of compressors and 
minimise the total operating cost of the gas network. The components of the total 
operating cost include the fuel cost, maintenance cost, start-up and shut-down costs of 
the compressors.  
 
Majority of the models discussed in this section have focussed on the operation and 
planning of specific components of gas transmission systems such as the pipeline 
network and compressor stations. However, an extensive analysis of the operation of 
gas transmission system is essential when addressing security of supply challenges in 
gas networks.  In addition to the pipeline system, the production sources, storage 
facilities and different types of demand requirement should be taken into 
consideration. 
  
2.3.4 Modelling Security of Gas Supply  
Several studies have applied optimisation models to analyse the security of gas supply 
in national and regional gas networks. This is due to the fact that  optimisation models 
take account of the interaction between different components of the gas network [67]. 
Hence such  models have the capability to provide further understanding of the impact 
of supply risks on various components of the gas network over multiple time scales 
(long-term or short term) [68]. Finally, these optimisation models can be used to assess 
the security of supply benefits derived from additional investments in gas 
infrastructure projects in any given national or regional gas network [69]. 
 
A couple of optimisation models have been developed to examine the impact of 
different scenarios of gas supply disruptions on security of supply at regional or 
national levels [70],[71], [72], [73]. All these models are privately owned and not 
available as open-source modelling tools. Thus, the European Gas Network model was 
developed to conduct studies related to security of gas supply in Europe. 
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The Gas Emergency Flow (GEMFLOW) model designed in [72] is based on a Monte 
Carlo probabilistic approach. The model depicts European countries as nodes 
interlinked by the aggregated capacities of cross-border pipelines between adjacent 
countries. The model has the capability to simulate several scenarios of a given supply 
disruption within Europe and also quantify the risk of the supply disruption to all 
European countries. The Monte-Carlo approach prevents unserved gas demand in EU 
countries by allowing the system to randomly match gas demand and supply based on 
a set of predefined rules.  However, the optimal strategy for gas dispatch within Europe 
is not based on the cost of system parameters. Hence the system operation cost is not 
considered.  
 
In  [73],  a decentralised  model of  congestion control  was proposed for the European 
gas system in the event of an emergency crisis. The model includes a fair distribution 
strategy that allows maximum gas flow through the available network capacity during 
a gas supply crisis in order to minimise unserved gas demand. However, the operation 
of gas storage facilities was not modelled or considered in this model. 
 
A linear optimisation model of the European gas market was developed in  [71]. The 
objective function of the model maximises the social welfare to gas consumers across 
Europe, subject to the capacity of the transport infrastructure. The model comprised a 
simplified representation of gas infrastructure facilities in Western and Central Europe 
as well as pipeline and LNG supply from imported sources. The model was used to 
identify gas transport constraints and analyse the impact of investment in gas transport 
facilities on the future development of the European gas market. However, gas 
dispatch within South East Europe was not considered in the model. 
 
The TIGER gas model was developed as a linear optimization model of gas supply 
across the European gas market [70]. The model presented a detailed representation of 
the European gas supply system including individual characteristics of storage 
facilities, LNG terminals, domestic production fields and demand locations.  The 
objective function of the model minimises the total cost of gas supply required to meet 
demand constrained by the capacities of pipelines, storage facilities, LNG terminals 
and production volume. However, the non-linear relationship between gas flow and 
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pressures were not taken into account.  The model was applied to assess the impact of 
gas supply interruptions on the operation of the European gas market [41],[70].  
 
The European gas network ( EGN) model presented in Chapter 3 of the thesis was also 
formulated using  the linear optimisation modelling  approach similar to the  TIGER 
model [70] but the main differences are: 
 The network linear optimisation was applied to the EGN due to its 
computational advantages. Network linear optimisation models is a special 
type of linear optimisation model that solves very large network problems very 
quickly.  
 In the EGN model, the non-linear relationship between gas storage and gas 
withdrawal rate was formulated using piece-wise linearization approximation 
(see Appendix C). This formulation provides a more realistic profile of gas 
storage operation.  
 
Other models investigated the adequacy of future gas network investments required to 
ensure security of supply, based on a range of future demand scenarios. However, these 
models include a simple representation of European gas network components and 
demand centres. Large gas consumer countries in Europe are represented individually, 
while smaller European countries are aggregated into regional gas demand centres. 
Gas flow on interconnectors due to gas disruption or demand fluctuation over short-
time scales (daily) is not fully captured in these studies because of their yearly time 
granularity. Examples of European gas network planning models developed in literature 
include The Gas market System for Trade Analysis in a Liberalising Europe (GASTALE) 
[74] and GASMOD [75]. 
 
 GASTALE is a game theory equilibrium model developed in [76].  The model depicts a 
simple representation of the European natural gas system including individual LNG and 
pipeline exporters to Europe. The GASTALE model has a temporal investment period of 
5 years and includes gas market agents such as consumers, producers, transmission system 
operators, storage operators and traders. The model has been applied to evaluate security 
of gas supply and the value of future gas infrastructure investment in Europe [77].  
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A similar modelling approach is used in GASMOD formulation but in this case it 
includes a two-stage game of natural gas export to Europe (upstream suppliers)  and 
wholesale gas trade within Europe (downstream traders) [75]. The model was applied 
to examine the impact of different scenarios of gas demand and supply on security of 
gas supply in Europe.  
 
2.4 Interdependence of Gas and Electricity Systems  
Traditionally natural gas systems and electrical power systems are operated separately 
by the respective system operators.  The use of gas-fired generators in the power 
generation, links the natural gas and electricity systems. The share of gas used in global 
power generation increased from 1752 TWh (14%) in 1990 to 4827 TWh (23%) in 
2010 [78],[79].  
 
The rapid growth of gas-fired generators in the power sector is driven by economic 
and environmental reasons [80]. Gas-fired generators (e.g. combined cycle gas 
turbine) are cost effective to build, and can be operated at high efficiency [81].  During 
operation, gas-fired generators produce less carbon dioxide per unit of energy than 
coal and oil generators [81].  
 
The integration of significant capacity of renewable electricity generation such as wind 
and solar to the power system is expected to contribute to the delivery of environmental 
and climate change targets in several countries in Europe towards 2030 [82]. Gas-fired 
generators have the capability to ramp up and down to balance the variable power 
generated from renewable generation.   
 
The increasing interaction between gas and electricity systems have attracted the 
attention of energy regulators and system operators to assess the impact of 
interdependence of both systems on the reliability of power supply and security of gas 
supply.  
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2.4.1 Similarities and Differences between Natural Gas Supply 
Systems and Electricity Power Systems  
Natural gas supply systems and electric power systems are important energy 
infrastructure. Both systems have transmission and distribution networks which are 
used to transport energy (gas or electricity) from production sources to the different 
categories of final consumers [83]. Natural gas is obtained from gas production wells 
while electricity is produced by different types of generation technologies such as wind 
generators, coal-fired power plants, gas-fired plants and hydro power plants [83]. In 
the gas system, the transmission and distribution networks are characterised by 
different pressure levels while the electricity transmission and distribution networks 
operate at different voltage levels [84].  
 
Although the gas and electricity systems include similar transport networks, both 
systems are operated differently based on their unique technical and physical 
characteristics. Electricity travels at the speed of light while gas flows through 
pipelines at 40- 60 km/h [85]. In electric power system operation power demand and 
supply is balanced on a second by second basis. On the other hand, the gas system can 
be balanced over a range of time scales (hourly / daily) due to the availability of gas 
stored in pipelines (linepack) or underground facilities.  
 
2.4.2 Technical Challenges of Integrated Gas and Electricity 
Systems  
The growing interdependence between natural gas and electricity systems presents 
new challenges with regards to the operation and planning of the integrated system.  
 
In a power system with a high penetration of gas-fired generators, the disruption of gas 
supply or the loss of a major gas network component (e.g. pipeline) may curtail the 
delivery of gas to gas-fired generators and consequently constrained power supply. 
Also, the regulatory arrangement for gas supply to priority consumers during a major 
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supply disruption may lead to a forced interruption of gas supply to gas-fired 
generators and additional power supply outages.  
 
At periods of severe weather conditions and limited gas supply, a coinciding peak in 
gas and electricity demand may lead to a sudden spike in gas and electricity prices.  As 
Europe’s reliance on imported gas supply increase,  the closer integration of gas and 
electricity systems in Europe could expose the power system to gas supply shocks and 
volatile gas prices [84].  
 
The increase in the variability of gas demand for power generation poses a major 
challenge of managing the gas network within acceptable pressure limits [86]. 
Consequently, gas compressors are frequently used to manage linepack and system 
pressure leading to an increase in operational cost in the gas network.  
 
Limited harmonisation in the long-term planning of gas and electricity networks is 
another challenge related to interdependence of both networks. For example, planned 
investment in cross-border electricity transmission capacity, electricity storage and 
demand response mechanism is expected to optimally manage variability and 
uncertainty of geographically dispersed renewable power generation across Europe 
[87]. The uncertainty surrounding the future gas use for power generation presents a 
barrier to investment in strategic projects identified to improve security of gas supply 
in the short-term. This is because some of the strategic projects investments may 
become stranded assets in the long-term [9].  
  
 However, a coordinated approach to infrastructure investment in both networks will 
ensure optimal utilisation of gas and electricity systems to provide the flexibility 
requirement of variable renewable power generation. 
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2.4.3 Model-Based Analysis of Integrated Gas and Electricity 
Systems  
Recent research studies have focused on the development new integrated gas and 
electricity models to analyse the interactions between gas and electricity networks. 
Most studies have focused on short-term analysis of integrated gas and electricity 
system.   
 
In [88], an optimal power flow model was combined with gas network constraints to 
create an integrated gas and electricity network model.  The model was used to analyse 
the impact of gas pipeline outage on the operation of the power system. The result 
showed the gas pipeline outage led to the loss of gas-fired generation and electric load 
shedding in the power system.  In [89],  gas network constraints were coupled with a 
security constrained unit commitment (SCUC) power system model. The integrated 
model was to assess the effect of dual fuel generators on power system security during 
a gas infrastructure outage. The results showed that the fuel switching capacity of dual 
fuel generators could increase power system security. An integrated gas and electricity 
model was developed  to examine the impact of wind forecast errors on the gas network 
[90]. The results of the study showed that increasing uncertainty of flexible gas 
demand raised the cost of gas system balancing. All the studies reviewed above have 
applied integrated gas and electricity network models to test or fictitious systems.  
 
Only a few integrated gas and electricity optimisation models have been developed to 
analyse real gas and electricity systems. A detailed representation of the GB gas and 
electricity transmission system is presented in [67]. The combined gas and electricity 
network model (CGEN) is a multi-period non-linear optimisation model. The model 
was used to investigate the effect of multiple gas infrastructure outages on the 
operation of an integrated GB gas and electricity network. It was shown that gas 
infrastructure failures resulted in unserved gas demand to the gas network and a 
significant reduction in gas-fired generation output generation.   
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In another study [86], the CGEN model was used to examine the effect of wind power 
generation on GB gas network. It was shown that when low wind generation coincides 
with high gas demand a rapid depletion of line pack could result in gas system pressure 
constraint. The rapid variation in gas demand for power generation increases gas 
compressor usage and leads to high operational cost.  In Chapter 4 of this thesis, the 
CGEN model was enhanced by including of cross-border gas interconnectors between 
GB and neighbouring European Countries. 
 
Some studies have examined the long-term planning of integrated gas and electricity 
network. In [91], the CGEN model was used to examine the impact of strategic 
investment in the gas network on enhancing security of energy supply in the integrated 
gas and electricity network. The model presented a combined optimisation of 
investment and operational decisions for the gas and electricity networks.   In another 
study, the CGEN model was used to investigate the additional gas and electricity 
infrastructure required to deliver a low carbon energy system by 2030 [92]. It was 
shown that coordinated planning of gas and electricity network enabled timely and 
efficient allocation of infrastructure capacity expansion in the development of optimal 
energy networks.  
 
A complementarity model was developed to investigate the potential substitution 
effect of long-term investment in a coupled European gas and electricity market [93]. 
The results showed that  a coordinated planning approach would  deliver optimal 
infrastructure investments  in an integrated gas and electricity system  [94]. In [95],  a 
combined gas market model (GASTALE) and an electricity market model (MTSIM) 
was used to assess cross-border infrastructure requirement (2030-2050) in Europe’s 
gas and electricity markets. The results showed that large scale deployment of 
renewable power generation combined with high energy efficiency measures resulted 
in significant reduction in the use of natural gas transmission capacity by 2050.  
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2.4.4 Synergies between Gas and Electricity Systems  
The integration of gas and electricity systems has significant opportunity to deliver 
security of supply, environmental benefits and optimal infrastructure investments in 
both systems. Some measures identified to enhance efficient coordination between gas 
and electricity systems include harmonisation of system balancing in both system 
across different time scales, development of flexible gas supply products and a 
combined approach to renewable energy development [80],[84].  
 
Power system operation requires real time (moment-by-moment) balancing of demand 
and generation. In the gas network, balancing is usually performed on a daily basis. 
The availability of within-day linepack flexibility services can contribute to the 
harmonisation of system balancing in the gas and electricity networks. Such 
arrangements will increase the efficient utilisation of the network capacity, improve 
reliability of the power system, reduce high cost of cumulative gas imbalance penalties 
incurred by shipper and lower gas prices to gas-fired generators [96].  
 
Access to gas storage can increase flexible gas supply to gas-fired generators and 
improve security of gas supply [81]. Gas storage facilities is used extensively for 
various applications including balancing short–term   and seasonal demand variations 
depending on the storage characteristics [24]. The efficient management fast cycle 
storage facilities can improve reliability of within-day balancing in both gas and 
electricity systems.  
 
Coordinated network planning of both markets promotes the exploitation of not just 
renewable power generation but renewable gas production and transport using the 
existing gas network. Renewable gas refers to gas produced from renewable energy 
sources such as biomethane derived from biogas obtained from organic waste and 
hydrogen. Power-to-gas systems convert electricity to hydrogen through the process 
of electrolysis. Regional and national gas transmission pipeline networks could 
provide storage capacity for biomethane and hydrogen produced from renewable 
power generation. In Europe, renewable gas development and supply could contribute 
to less reliance on imported gas supply, additional flexibility for variable renewable 
power generation and lower carbon dioxide emissions [97].   
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2.5 Summary 
A review of literature related to security of gas supply in Europe, gas network models 
and the integrated gas and electricity system was presented. 
 
Security of gas supply was defined and issues surrounding security of gas supply in 
Europe were highlighted. A number of alternative measures planned to enhance 
security of European gas supply were presented. 
 
Gas network models were presented with a specific focus on optimisation models. 
Different types of optimisation models used in modelling gas network were discussed 
and relevant literature on the analysis of security of gas supply using gas network 
optimisation models was reviewed. 
 
Interdependence of gas and electricity systems were presented. Challenges and 
opportunities for exploiting integrated gas and electricity system were discussed and 
existing models of integrated gas and electricity system in literature were reviewed. 
 
In closely coupled gas and electricity networks, security of gas supply has serious 
implications for a secure and reliable power system. Integrated models of gas and 
electricity systems are best suited to provide a better understanding of security of gas 
and electricity supply under various operating conditions. 
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Chapter 3  
3.Vulnerability Assessment of the European Natural 
Gas Supply  
3.1 Introduction 
The primary function of the European gas network is to ensure efficient dispatch of 
gas supply across Europe. The disruption of gas supplies along major transit routes has 
highlighted the limited capability of the gas network to adequately respond to such a 
gas supply crisis.  
 
In January 2009, the disruption of Russian gas supply to Europe through Ukraine 
resulted in the loss of between 10% – 100% of imported gas supply to 12 European 
countries [98]. Some of the limitations that this event highlighted include dependency 
of some member states on a single source of supply/route, the lack of bi-directional 
flow in some interconnectors between countries and limited gas storage capacities in 
some of the affected member states.  
 
A simplified model of the European gas network was developed to model gas flows in 
Europe using linear optimisation. The European gas network model was formulated 
and solved using the FICO Xpress optimisation suite. 
 
The European gas network model was used to analyse the impact of a loss of the 
Ukraine transit capacity on gas supply from Russia to Europe in the winter of 
2014/2015.  Two demand scenarios were modelled; A Reference Demand Case and a 
High Demand Case. To mitigate the impact of the supply shortage, the impact of 
increasing the capacities of selected interconnectors within Europe was compared 
against increasing the maximum storage withdrawal rates in South East Europe. 
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3.2 Simplification of the European Gas Network  
The European gas network consists of 128 underground storage facilities, 68 LNG 
regasification terminals connected by a complex and an extensive pipeline structure. 
The implementation of a detailed model of such large networks has a significant 
computational cost. Furthermore, the transmission pipeline data (such as pipe lengths 
and diameters) for all European countries represented in the model required to conduct 
a detailed study was inaccessible. Since the focus of this model is to analyse cross-
border flows on gas interconnectors between adjacent European countries and the 
utilisation of available gas infrastructure, the capacities of transmission pipelines was 
deemed adequate to represent gas dispatch within Europe.  The European gas network 
(EGN) was simplified to reduce network complexities and simulation time in order to 
provide a suitable representation of the network for modelling purposes.  
 
The following assumptions were applied to simply the European gas network: 
 Only gas flow capacities on cross-border interconnectors between European 
countries were considered. The capacity of the pipeline network within 
individual countries was neglected.  
 Units of gas capacity are presented as million cubic metres at standard 
conditions of temperature 15oC and pressure 101.325 kPa  [22]. 
 
3.2.1 Network Parameters  
The simplified European gas network consists of 40 nodes and 63 interconnectors that 
comprise the Ukraine transit capacity shown in Figure 3.1. A list of the country codes 
is presented in Appendix A. 
 
The model assigns a node to each country and each node has a set of nodal parameters. 
For each European country, the nodal parameters include the total production capacity, 
the total storage capacity and the total LNG capacity if applicable. The nodal 
parameters for non-European gas exporting countries are limited to their total export 
capacities to Europe.   
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Figure 3.1 Simplified European gas network  
 
Cross-border gas pipelines are characterised by different pipe lengths and flow 
capacities. A single pipeline or several pipelines can connect two neighbouring 
countries based on their domestic network configuration. Multiple cross border 
pipelines capacities between countries are totalled to represent a single pipeline 
capacity using Equation 3.1. 
 𝑄𝑒𝑞 = ∑𝑄𝑖
𝑛
𝑖=1
   3.1 
 
where 𝑄𝑒𝑞 is the equivalent flow capacity in the single equivalent pipeline and 𝑄𝑖  are 
original individual pipeline capacities.  
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3.3 Formulation of the European Gas Network Model  
The European gas network (EGN) model is formulated using the commercial 
optimisation tool FICO Xpress optimisation suite [99]. Fico Xpress is a mathematical 
modelling tool for large-scale modelling and optimisation applications. The tool 
provides a variety of robust optimisation solvers for linear programming, mixed linear 
and non-linear problems.  
 
The EGN model is developed as a linear programming optimisation model to examine 
optimal operation of the gas network. The linear optimisation approach assumes 
efficient dispatch of natural gas along all supply routes across Europe, neglecting the 
inefficiencies due to market operation or contractual arrangements. A single Europe 
wide transmission system operator was assumed to manage the efficient gas demand 
and supply balance within the European gas network model.  
 
Figure 3.2 shows a graphical representation of the simplified European gas network 
model. The key inputs to the model are the demand, supply capacities (domestic 
production and imported gas), the capacities of gas infrastructure (interconnectors, 
LNG regasification terminal and storage facilities) and the cost parameters 
(supply/production, transportation and, where relevant, LNG import cost and storage 
costs). The model is suitable for calculating the quantity of demand-supply shortfalls 
at different nodes in the network over a given modelling horizon with a daily to weekly 
time step. 
 
 
Chapter 3                                               Vulnerability Assessment of the European Natural Gas Supply    
 
 
 
38 
 
  
Figure 3.2 Flow diagram of the European gas network model 
 
3.3.1 Objective Function  
The objective function of the model minimises the total cost of the supply of natural 
gas supply to meet demand over the time horizon as expressed in Equation 3.2. The 
total supply cost includes costs of gas supplies (from domestic production and pipeline 
imports), gas transport, storage operation, LNG import and unserved gas demand. 
Minimise total supply cost = 
 
∑
{
 
 
 
 
 ∑𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 
𝑖⏟          
𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑 /𝑝𝑖𝑝𝑒𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡
+∑(𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 +𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑)
𝑖⏟                
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 
 
𝑡
+∑𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗  𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑗⏟          
𝐺𝑎𝑠 𝑓𝑙𝑜𝑤𝑠  
+∑𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡 𝐿𝑖,𝑡
𝑖⏟      
𝐿𝑁𝐺 𝑖𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡 
  + ∑𝐷𝑍𝐶𝑖  𝐷𝑍𝑖,𝑡
𝑖⏟        
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑}
 
 
 
 
 
where: 
3.2 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Cost of gas production/cost of gas imported at node i at time t (€/mcm) 
MODEL
Demand Scenarios
Supply  Scenario
Domestic  production
Gas imports 
Gas Infrastructure 
National production fields
Storage facilities   
LNG receiving terminals  
 Interconnector capacities    
Constraints
 
 Max production capacities 
 Max regasification 
capacities 
 Max working gas volume 
 Max injection rate 
 Max withdrawal rate 
 Max interconnector flow 
capacities
Gas flows on 
interconnectors 
Gas storage injection and 
withdrawal volumes, Gas 
import  and domestic 
production volumes, 
LNG import volumes 
OUTPUTINPUT Objective Function
Minimise total supply cost of 
gas delivery to meet demand 
constrained by available 
infrastructure capacities 
 
Optimal supply  cost 
Granularity
 
 Daily  time scale
  Network area covers 40 
countries 
Locations of  unserved 
gas demand 
Volume of unserved gas 
demand 
Costs
Production cost, Storage 
cost, Regasification cost
Pipeline transport cost
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𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 Production/ supply volume at node i at and time t (mcm/d) 
𝐼𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Cost of gas injected into storage at node i and time t (€/mcm) 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 Gas volumes injected into a storage at node i at time t (mcm/d) 
𝑊𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Cost of storage withdrawals at node i (€/mcm) 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 Storage withdrawals at node i and time t (mcm/d) 
𝑇𝐶𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 Cost of gas transportation in a cross-border interconnector between node 
i and j at time t (€/mcm) 
𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 Gas flows on interconnector between nodes i and node j at time t 
(mcm/d) 
𝐿𝐶𝑖,𝑡 Cost of LNG delivered (cost of gas and transport) to node i at time t 
(€/mcm) 
𝐿𝑖,𝑡 LNG volumes delivered at node i and time t (mcm/d) 
𝐷𝑍𝐶𝑖 Cost of unserved demand at node i (€/mcm) 
𝐷𝑍𝑖,𝑡 Unserved gas demand at node i at time t (mcm/d) 
 
3.3.2 Optimisation Constraints  
The constraints of the optimisation are the technical limitations and characteristics of 
production, transport storage and LNG facilities. 
 
 Production 
For nodes that possess production capacity, the production volume is restricted by the 
maximum daily supply capacity: 
 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑃𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.3 
where  𝑃𝑅𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum supply capacity at node i (mcm/d)  
    
 LNG Import  
Similar to the production constraints, at every node and for each time step, the LNG 
regasification volume is restricted by the maximum daily regasification. 
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 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝐿𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.4 
where 𝐿𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum regasification capacity at node i (mcm/d). 
 
 Transport pipeline flow  
Gas flow through interconnectors is restricted by the maximum capacities 𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥 of 
the interconnectors given by: 
 𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡 ≤ 𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗
𝑚𝑎𝑥   ∀𝑖, 𝑗, 𝑡 3.5 
Each interconnector is linked by a pair of nodes (i,j). Gas flow in either direction is 
permitted if flow capacity exists between i and j and between j and i.  
 
 Storage  
Storage operation is determined by the characteristics of the storage facility which 
include working gas volume (WGV), gas withdrawal rates and gas injection rates. 
Working gas volume is the volume of gas that can be withdrawn from storage. For 
every time step the storage level is constrained by the maximum storage capacity 
(WGV): 
𝑆𝑖,𝑡 ≤ 𝑆𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥 ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.6 
where 𝑆𝑖
𝑚𝑎𝑥  is the maximum working gas capacity at node i (mcm), 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 is current 
storage level at node s and time t (mcm/d). 
 Also, the gas volume in storage for each time step must be balanced by the difference 
in gas injection in a day and withdrawal in a day:  
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 = 𝑆𝑖,𝑡−1 + 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑    ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.7 
Gas withdrawal rate is also restricted by the maximum withdrawal rate: 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑_𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.8 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑_𝑚𝑎𝑥 is the maximum withdrawal rate at node i (mcm/d).  
Gas injection rate is limited by the maximum injection rate: 
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 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥    ∀𝑖, 𝑡 3.9 
where 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑎𝑥is the maximum injection rate at facility s at time t (mcm/d).  
 
The volume of gas withdrawn from or injected into a storage facility varies with the 
current storage level. Withdrawal rates are highest when the storage is full while 
injection rate is highest when the storage facility is empty because of the pressure level 
in the storage. This non-linear relationship is expressed as [100]: 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑑_𝑚𝑥 = 𝐾1
𝑤𝑑 ∗ √𝑆𝑖,𝑡    ∀𝑠, 𝑡       
3.10 
 
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑥 = 𝐾1
𝑖𝑛 ∗  √
1
𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗 + 𝑆𝑖
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒
+ 𝐾2
𝑖𝑛   3.11 
where 𝐾1
𝑤𝑑, 𝐾1
𝑖𝑛and  𝐾2
𝑖𝑛are factors that describe the features of the storage 
facility, 𝑆𝑖
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the volume of cushion gas at node i (mcm). However linear 
approximations were derived for the non-linear storage constraints and presented in 
Appendix B. 
 
3.4.3 Nodal Balance  
At each node in the network, gas demand must be balanced by gas supply (Equation 
3.12). For each time step gas inflows at each node (gas supply, storage withdrawal) 
are balanced by gas outflows (gas demand, storage injection). 
𝐷𝑖,𝑡 − 𝐷𝑍𝑖,𝑡 = ∑𝑇𝑄𝑖,𝑗,𝑡
𝑖,𝑗
+ 𝑃𝑅𝑖,𝑡 + 𝐿𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑤𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 3.12 
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3.4 Model Demonstration  
The European gas network model was validated by comparing the cross-border flows 
calculated by the model for 2010 with data of the aggregated gas flow across Europe 
for the 2010 gas year. The results of the comparison between simulations and actual 
data are presented in Table 3.1. 
 
Table 3.1 Comparison of gas flows and LNG import simulation result to actual data 
for 2010. 
 
From Country  To Country Actual (bcm) Simulated (bcm)  
LNG Import Belgium  6.4 4.5 
Netherland  Belgium  19.7 21.3 
Norway  Belgium  7.0 14.6 
United Kingdom Belgium  8.8 3.5 
Czech Republic Germany 17 21.8 
Norway  Germany 32.2 27.0 
Poland  Germany 33 22 
Belgium France 13.5 16.0 
LNG Import France 14 10 
Norway  France 19.1 18.5 
Austria Italy 18.5 20.0 
LNG Import Italy 12.6 11.0 
Norway  Netherland  12.9 9.2 
Algeria Spain 9.1 9.0 
LNG Import Spain 27.8 28.7 
Netherland  United Kingdom 8.2 4.5 
Norway  United Kingdom 25.0 30.0 
LNG  United Kingdom 18.6 14.1 
 
The results of the simulation matched the real data except for a few cases. The reason 
for the lack of agreement is believed to be that the long-term contracts between gas 
producers and destination countries are not taken into account in the simulation as the 
supply terms and prices of long-term contracts are in most cases not publicly available. 
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3.5 Description of the Case Studies  
The case studies were based on the gas demand for winter 2014 and two demand cases 
were defined as Reference Demand Case and High Demand Case as shown in Figure 
3.3 [13]. The simulation has a daily time step and was run over 182 days from October 
2014 to March 2015. 
 
Figure 3.3 Structure of the case studies  
 
3.5.1 Demand Assumptions  
 Reference Demand Case 
The Reference Demand Case represents a low winter gas demand situation in 2014. 
Daily demand was derived as average daily consumption calculated from historical 
monthly demand consumption for all European countries [101]. The daily demand was 
calculated by dividing the number of days in each month by the monthly gas 
consumption.  For example, the daily demand data of Netherlands and Spain is shown 
in Figure 3.4. The demand data for all European countries are presented in Appendix 
C. 
 
 
Case Studies 
Reference Demand Case High Demand Case 
Loss of UkraineNo Loss No Loss Loss of Ukraine
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 High Demand Case  
The High Demand Case assumed a 20% increase in the gas demand of the Reference 
Case to reflect a cold winter condition across all European countries. 
 
 Peak Day Demand  
A peak day demand was applied to the Reference Demand Case and High Demand 
Case. The 1 in 20 peak day demand is the highest demand for gas in a day which occurs 
once out of 20 winters [102]. This gas standard is used to test the resilience of the 
system to an extreme stress condition. It was assumed that peak demand occurred on 
the same day in all the European countries. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.4 Average daily demand profile of Netherlands and Spain for 2014 winter 
 
3.5.2 Gas Supply Assumptions 
Supply data was obtained from the ten-year network development plan [13] (see 
Appendix B). The delivery of imported pipeline supplies was determined from 
historical supply volume to Europe and the suppliers’ production capacity. Based on 
historical winter supply, average gas supply from pipeline import sources and LNG 
import was increased by 10% to obtain the maximum available supply [38].  
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Table 3.2 European winter gas supply for 2014 – Major gas supply sources 
 
Supply source Maximum supply (mcm/d) 
Russia 500 
Norway 330 
Algeria 111 
Libya 30 
Aggregated national production in the EU  725 
Total LNG import to Europe   355 
 
3.5.3 Cost Assumption 
The costs of domestic production in the Europe, LNG supplies and imported pipeline 
gas to Europe are presented in Appendix B.  
 
3.5.4 Supply Disruption Assumption  
The loss of all transmission capacities to Europe routed through Ukraine was examined 
in the Reference Demand Case and High Demand Case for 30 days from mid-
January to mid-February (see Figure 3.3). The 30-day period included the peak day 
demand. The duration of the supply disruption was selected to determine whether the 
EU security of supply standard for domestic gas consumers is attained over the coldest 
30 days of winter across Europe (see 2.2.4).  
 
3.5.5 Mitigation Measures  
Two different mitigation measures were applied to each of the demand cases. 
 Additional interconnector capacities in Europe. 
Transmission capacities of selected interconnectors were increased to allow greater 
gas flow from west to east Europe. This increase in capacity could be achieved by 
investment in additional compression stations or upgrading existing stations with 
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additional compressor units. The flow capacity of the following interconnectors was 
adjusted [103] :  
1. Flow capacity on the Hungary-Romania interconnector was increased from 
4.09 mcm/d to 8.18 mcm/d. 
2. Flow capacity on the Hungary-Serbia interconnector was increased from 
11.2 mcm/d to 22.4 mcm/d.  
3. Reverse flow capacity of 9.6 mcm/d was also allowed on the Greece-
Bulgaria interconnector.  
4. Flow capacity of the Russia-Germany interconnector was extended from 
85 mcm/d to 150 mcm/d.  
 
 Higher storage withdrawal rates in South East Europe  
A 50% increase in maximum withdrawal rate was applied to Serbia, Romania and 
Bulgaria. These countries primarily rely on imported gas from Russia through the 
Ukraine transit capacity (see Figure 3.1).  The increase in maximum withdrawal rate 
could be achieved by increasing the number of withdrawal wells in an existing storage 
facility. The cost of the well construction range between 15% - 33% of the total capital 
cost of a new storage facility [23].     
 
3.6 Simulation Results of Case Studies without the Loss of 
Ukraine Transit Capacity  
The results are presented as average day gas volumes over the 182 days of winter 
2014/2015 (including the peak day). 
 
3.6.1 Domestic Production and Import Gas Volumes to Europe  
Figure 3.5 shows the comparison of gas supply volumes from domestic production and 
import sources without the loss of the Ukraine transit capacity. Domestic gas 
production accounted for 30% of total supplies in the Reference Demand Case and 
28% of total supplies in the High Demand Case.  The average gas supplied from Russia 
was 500 mcm/d, accounting for 30% of total supplies in the Reference Demand Case 
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and 27% of total supplies in High Demand Case. LNG volumes increased from 185 
mcm/d in the Reference Demand Case to 335 mcm/d in the High Demand Case. 
Figure 3.5 Average domestic production and gas import supplies to Europe - No Loss 
Case 
 
3.6.2 Gas withdrawn from European Storage Facilities  
Gas volumes withdrawn from storage facilities are presented in Figure 3.6. Gas storage 
facilities in Other Europe showed the largest gas withdrawals of 132 mcm/d in the 
Reference Demand Case and 224 mcm/d in the High Demand Case. Storage 
withdrawals in German increased from 95 mcm/d in the Reference Demand Case to 
185 mcm/d in the High Demand Case. Central Europe storage withdrawals increased 
by 217% in the High Demand Case compared to the Reference Demand Case while 
gas withdrawals in South East Europe increased by 28% in the High Demand Case as 
against the Reference Demand Case. 
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Figure 3.6 Average gas withdrawn from European storage facilities - No Loss Case 
(South East includes Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Serbia and Turkey  
Central Europe includes Austria, Czech Republic, Poland, Hungary and Slovakia 
Other Europe comprises storage facilities in European countries excluding South East Europe, Germany and Italy) 
 
3.7 Impact of the Loss of Ukraine Transit Capacity  
The loss of the Ukraine transit capacity was then applied for a 30-day period. The 
results of the simulation with the supply disruption for the High Demand Case are 
presented as average gas volume over the 30-day period including the peak day. 
 
3.7.1 Domestic Production and Imported Gas Volume to Europe  
Figure 3.7 presents the domestic production and imported gas volume to Europe in the 
High Demand Case. The loss of Ukraine transit capacity resulted in a 52% decline in 
Russian gas volumes supplied to Europe in compared to the No Loss Case. To 
compensate for the lost gas volumes, Domestic production volume increased by 12 
mcm/d relative to No Loss Case. In addition, LNG supplies increased by 7.7% in the 
in the Loss Case to replace some of the supply shortfall. 
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Figure 3.7 Domestic production and gas import to Europe - High Demand Case  
 
3.7.2 Gas Withdrawn from European Storage Facilities  
The storage withdrawn from European storage facilities in the High Demand Case is 
shown in Figure 3.8. 
 
Figure 3.8 Gas withdrawn from storage - High Demand Case   
 
Additional withdrawals from gas storage of 8 mcm/d in Other Europe, 51 mcm/d in 
Italy, and 48 mcm/d in Germany was used to replace some of the missing gas volumes 
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in the Loss Case. Central Europe showed the largest increase in storage withdrawals 
of 92 mcm/d in the Loss Case compared to the No Loss Case. The reason for this is 
that many countries in Central Europe and South East Europe rely on the Russian gas 
supply through the Ukraine transit capacity. Storage withdrawals increased by only 18 
mcm/d in South East Europe in the Loss Case due to the limited storage capacity in 
that region.  
 
3.7.3 Unserved Gas Demand  
Average daily unserved gas demand is calculated over the 30-day duration of the 
supply disruption.  The average daily unserved gas demand in countries affected by 
the supply disruption in the High Demand Case is presented in Table 3.3.  
 
Table 3.3 Average daily unserved gas demand - High Demand Case 
 
Loss Case 
Country  Macedonia Bosnia  Bulgaria  Romania  Greece 
Unserved gas 
demand (mcm/d) 
1.3 2.0 9.6 4.1 0.8 
% of average daily 
demand curtailed  
97.4 78.7 60.7 7.2 4.2 
 
Unserved gas demand did not occur in any country in the No Loss Case. However, in 
the Loss Case unserved gas demand was noted in south eastern European countries 
that primarily depend on the Russian gas supply through the Ukraine transit route and 
have limited access to alternative supply sources or transport routes. In Bulgaria, 
Bosnia and Macedonia between 61% - 97% of average day gas demand was unmet in 
the High Demand Case. The supply disruption resulted in curtailment of heating 
demand (domestic & commercial sectors) in only Bosnia. However, a third of the  
gas-fired district heating plants have the capability to switch to fuel oil to supply 
domestic heating [104].  In 2013, heating demand accounted for less than 2% of total 
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gas consumption in Bulgaria, 24% of total gas consumption in Bosnia and 2% of total 
gas consumption in Macedonia [105], [106], [107]. 
 
On the other hand, gas supply to industrial and power generation sector was completed 
curtailed in Bulgaria, Macedonia and Romania. In 2013, the industrial sector 
accounted for 70% of total gas consumption in Bulgaria, 70% of total gas consumption 
in Bosnia and   90% in total gas consumption in Macedonia [106],[107], [108]. In these 
countries, the industrial sector is dominated by steel and metal industries reliant on 
natural gas as fuel for their production process [109]. Hence, the missing gas supply 
have consequences of severe economic costs and losses.  In 2013, the use of gas in 
power generation ranged between   0% - 2%  in Bosnia, Macedonia and Bulgaria [110]. 
 
In Greece and Romania, less than 10% of average day gas demand was curtailed in the 
High Demand Case respectively. The availability of LNG supply to Greece provides 
an alternative to diversify gas supply from Russia through Ukraine. However, the 
existing LNG import capacity was not sufficient to avert the disruption of gas supply 
to some industrial consumers. In Romania, only gas use in power generation was 
affected by the supply shortfall.   
 
3.8 Simulation Results of the Mitigation Strategies  
Figure 3.9 presents gas flow on selected interconnectors and storage utilisation in the 
High Demand Case (Loss of Ukraine), Higher storage withdrawal rates and Additional 
interconnector capacities.  
Russian gas supply through Germany increased by 44% with Additional 
interconnector capacities strategy compared to the High Demand Case (Loss of 
Ukraine). The expansion of the Russian - Germany interconnector allowed the 
diversion of Russian gas supply from Ukraine transit capacity. In addition, higher gas 
flow on cross-border interconnectors from Western Europe to South East Europe was 
noted as a result of additional capacities on selected interconnectors within South East 
Europe.  
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Figure 3.9 Gas flows on selected interconnectors and storage utilisation in the High 
Demand Case (Loss of Ukraine) and the different mitigating measures 
Gas withdrawn from German storages deceased by 38% in the Additional 
interconnector capacities strategy and by 16% in the Higher storage withdrawal rates 
strategy compared to the High Demand Case (Loss of Ukraine). This showed that 
German gas storage withdrawals was also used to compensate for the supply shortage 
to South West Europe when the loss of Ukraine transit capacity occurred. However, 
with the implementation of the mitigation strategies, Germany storage volumes 
initially sent to South East Europe was substituted by higher gas flows on cross-border 
interconnectors and increased gas withdrawals from storage facilities within South 
East Europe. 
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Figure  3.10 Unserved gas demand in the High Demand Case (Loss of Ukraine) and 
the different mitigating measures  
 
In Figure 3.10, implementation of additional interconnector capacities resulted in the 
decreasing unserved gas demand decreased by 3mcm/d (50%) in Bulgaria, 3.4 mcm/d 
(82%) in Romania and 1.7 mcm/d (84%) in Bosnia compared to High Demand Case 
(Loss of Ukraine). On the other hand, higher storage withdrawal rates resulted in a 
95% decline in unserved gas demand in Romania and a 78% decline in unserved gas 
demand in Greece compared to the High Demand Case (Loss of Ukraine).  
 
3.9 Summary  
A European gas network model was described. The model represented all gas 
interconnectors including routes to major import sources, LNG terminals and storage 
facilities in Europe. The model was used to investigate the impact of the loss of gas 
transit capacity through Ukraine on European gas supply for winter 2014/2015.  
 
In the event of a 30-day loss of Ukraine transit capacity, the simulation results showed 
that a combination of LNG supplies and available stored gas will be used to 
compensate for the supply shortfall.  
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 However, considerable unserved gas demand was evident in Macedonia, Bosnia, and 
Bulgaria in South East Europe. The results of the study showed that domestic gas 
supply in Bosnia was adversely affected in Bosnia due to the supply disruption. It was 
shown that showing that this region was reliant on the Ukraine transit route and had 
limited alternative supply routes. 
 
The results of the study showed that additional capacities on selected gas 
interconnectors including reverse flow capacity on some gas interconnectors enabled 
Russian gas supply through Germany and Central Europe reach South East Europe in 
order to reduce the missing gas volumes. It was also shown that higher storage 
withdrawal rate in some countries in South East Europe reduced instances of unserved 
gas in the region. 
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Chapter 4  
4.Integrating Models of the European Gas Network 
and Great Britain’s Energy Networks  
4.1 Introduction  
In 2014, the UK imported 43 bcm of natural gas of which 58% came from Norway, 
26% from LNG and 16% from continental Europe [31]. As domestic production 
declines, the UK will increasingly rely on imported gas to meet its future demand 
[111].  According to the 2015 National Grid Future Energy Scenarios (FES),  future 
gas supplies to GB will depend on the demand and supply balance in Europe and 
developments in the global LNG market [31]. 
 
The European gas network model (EGN), which was presented in Chapter 3, was 
coupled to the GB combined gas and electricity network model (CGEN) and used to 
investigate the interdependencies between the European gas network and GB’s gas and 
electricity networks. A soft-linking approach was employed to couple the EGN and 
CGEN models. The integrated (EGN – CGEN) model was applied to a set of scenarios 
to assess the impact of supply shocks in the European gas network on the operation of 
the GB gas and electricity networks. 
 
The combined gas and electricity network model (CGEN), originally developed by 
Chaudry et al [3] is a multi-time period optimisation modelling tool. It is used to 
examine the interaction of gas and electricity networks as an integrated system. The 
key features of the CGEN model are presented in this chapter. However, a detailed 
description of the model formulation is provided in Appendix D. 
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4.2 The Soft-Link Approach: Coupling EGN model and the 
CGEN model  
A soft link methodology was used to integrate the European gas network model (EGN) 
and the combined gas and electricity network model (CGEN). The structure of the 
integrated model is shown in Figure 4.1. The EGN is depicted in the upper section of 
Figure 4.1.  The model was developed to analyse natural gas supply across 37 countries 
in Europe. The key model inputs include each European country’s gas demand, 
domestic production as well as aggregated capacities of storage and LNG facilities. 
The non-linear relationship between pressure and gas flow through pipelines is not 
represented in this model. 
 
Figure 4.1 Structure of the integrated EGN- CGEN model  
 
The CGEN model is shown in the lower section of the Figure 4.1.                                
The CGEN model is depicted in the lower section of Figure 4.1. The model includes a  
detailed representation of the GB gas and electricity networks. The key inputs of the 
model include gas terminal capacities, gas transmission pipelines parameters 
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(comprising diameters, lengths and pressures), operational characteristics of 
compressor stations and storage facilities, electricity generation technologies and 
electricity transmission lines. Model outputs include volume of gas supplied at 
terminals, storage utilisation, change in linepack and power generation output.  
 
The soft link methodology involved an exchange of a set of variables between the 
models in an iterative process. The variables taken from the EGN are gas flow on 
cross-border interconnectors between GB and continental Europe and their 
corresponding gas supply prices. Three cross-border interconnectors link GB to the 
rest of Europe namely; Norway to GB interconnector (NO-GB), Netherland to GB 
interconnector (NL-GB) and the bi-directional interconnector between GB and 
Belgium (GB-BE).  
 
The total GB gas demand is a variable obtained from the CGEN model. The total GB 
gas demand was calculated as the sum of the non-electric gas demand and the amount 
gas used by gas-fired generators for power generation.  The non-electric demand is an 
exogenous input while the amount of gas used by gas-fired generation for power 
generation is endogenously determined in the CGEN model. The CGEN model 
calculates the gas used for electricity generation based on the price of natural gas 
relative to the cost of generating electricity using alternative generation technologies 
such as coal. Hence, gas used for power generation decreases when gas prices are high 
and vice versa.  
  
4.2.1 Description of the CGEN model  
The CGEN model was modified to include the individual cross-border pipelines 
between GB gas network and neighbouring European countries.  Figure 4.2 shows a 
schematic diagram of the GB gas network coupled by cross-border pipelines at 
Norway, Netherland and Belgium to the rest of the European gas network. GB gas 
terminals receive gas from offshore production fields, LNG import and cross-border 
pipelines with Continental Europe. 
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Figure 4.2 Linkages between GB gas network and the European gas network 
 
In this study, Continental Europe refers to all EU countries, Bosnia, Macedonia and 
Serbia. It excludes GB and Republic of Ireland.  
 
 The Objective Function  
The objective function of the CGEN model is to minimise the combined operational 
cost of gas and electricity networks whilst meeting gas and electricity demand. The 
operational cost includes costs of gas supplies, gas storage operation, change in 
linepack, electricity generation, unserved gas demand and electrical energy as 
expressed in Equation 4.1. The general formulation and description of the CGEN 
model is presented in Appendix D. 
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Minimise total operational cost (£) = 
 
∑𝑡𝑠
𝑡
× 
{
 
 
 
 
∑𝐶𝑎,𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑄𝑎,𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
𝑎⏟        
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠
+∑(𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑  𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 − 𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
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𝑠⏟                
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ ∑𝐶𝑡
𝑠𝑝𝜕𝐿𝑃ℎ,𝑡
ℎ⏟        
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𝑔𝑒𝑛
𝑔
 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 
⏟        
 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ ∑𝐶𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
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𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 
⏟              
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
+  ∑𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑏
 𝑄𝑏,𝑡
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
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𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.1
  
where :  
𝐶𝑎,𝑡 gas cost from terminal 𝑎  at time 𝑡 (£/m
3) 
𝑄𝑎,𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
 gas supplied from terminal 𝑎 at time 𝑡  (m3/d) 
𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 cost of gas withdrawn from storage facility 𝑠 at time 𝑡 (£/m3) 
𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 volume of gas withdrawn from storage facility 𝑠  at time 𝑡  (m3/d) 
𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
 cost of storage injection into storage facility 𝑠  and time 𝑡 (£/m
3) 
𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
 volume of gas injected in storage facility 𝑠  at time 𝑡 (m
3/d) 
𝐶𝑡
𝑠𝑝
 spot gas price at time 𝑡 (£/m3) 
𝜕𝐿𝑃ℎ,𝑡 changes in linepack of pipe ℎ at time 𝑡 (m
3/d) 
𝐶𝑔
𝑔𝑒𝑛
 generation cost of generator 𝑔 (£/MWh) 
𝑃𝑔,𝑡 power output from generator 𝑔 at time 𝑡 (MW) 
𝐶𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 cost of unserved gas demand (£/m3) 
𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
 volume of unserved gas energy at node 𝑖  and time  𝑡 (m
3/d) 
𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 cost of unserved electrical energy (£/MWh) 
𝑄𝑏,𝑡
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑 unserved electric power at bus 𝑏 and time 𝑡 (MW) 
 
4.2.2 Stages Involved in the Soft-Link Approach  
The coupling of the CGEN and EGN models is described in the following steps below: 
Step 1: The EGN model received gas demand, domestic production and storage 
capacities for each European country as input data (Section 3.4).  
Chapter 4      Integrating Models of the European Gas Network and Great Britain’s Energy Networks  
 
 
 
60 
 
  
Step 2: The EGN model was run to obtain gas flow on the European interconnectors 
linked to the GB gas network and their corresponding gas supply prices. 
Step 3: The gas supply prices and cross-border gas flow profiles calculated in the EGN 
were used as input in the CGEN model. 
Step 4: The CGEN model was run to obtain the amount of gas consumed in electricity 
generation. 
Step 5:  The gas demand in electricity generation was used to calculate the total GB 
gas demand profile which was updated in the next run of the EGN model.  
Step 6: Steps 3, 4 and 5 were iterated (repeated sequentially) until the gas flow on the 
interconnectors linked to the GB network and total GB gas demand profile reaches the 
convergence criterion or after four iterative cycles. The convergence criterion was 
given by Eq.3.2. 
 
𝑁𝑘 − 𝑁𝑘−1 
𝑁𝑘
≤  0.05 4.2 
 
where 𝑁 is the GB gas demand data exchanged between the EGN and CGEN 
models, 𝑘 is the iteration number.  
Once the models converged and a solution was reached, the loss of Ukraine transit 
capacity was applied in the EGN. The resulting cross border gas flows on the 
interconnectors connecting GB to Europe were imported into CGEN model to examine 
the impact of the supply disruption on gas dispatch in GB gas and electricity networks.  
 
4.3 Description of Scenarios  
Two scenarios of GB wind generation capacity and non-electric gas demand shown in 
Figure 4.3 were modelled using a daily time step for 90 days of cold winter (January-
March) in 2030. The modelling period was selected to cover the days of coldest winter 
demand and low gas storage levels across Europe. Historical gas demand data obtained 
from [112] showed that January and February were the two consecutive months of the 
highest gas demand in the winter season in GB and Continental Europe. By the end of 
the winter season in March, gas storage stocks often reach their lowest levels [113].  
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The minimum storage levels at the end of winter (March) depends on a number of 
factors including a prolonged cold winter condition in March or the loss of a key supply 
source. For instance, GB storage level reached 3% of maximum storage capacity in 
March 2013 due to a prolonged cold weather condition [113].  
  
The scenarios were defined as the Reference Scenario and the Slow Transition 
Scenario. The key features of the scenarios are presented in Table 4.1.  
Figure  4.3 Structure of the scenarios  
 
Table 4.1 Key features of the scenarios 
  
Parameters Assumptions 
Reference Slow Transition 
No Loss 
Case 
Loss 
Case 
No Loss 
Case 
Loss 
Case 
GB non-electric gas demand (bcm) 23 27 
Installed GB wind generation 
capacity (GW) 
51 41 
European Union gas demand (bcm) 136 
Total capacity of European gas 
interconnectors (mcm/d) 
2981 2595 2981 2595 
 
4.3.1 Reference Scenario  
Scenarios 
                     Reference
 Low non-electric gas demand 
 High wind generation capacity in 
GB 
Slow Transition
 High non-electric gas demand 
 Low wind generation capacity in 
GB 
Loss of UkraineNo Loss No Loss Loss of Ukraine
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This scenario assumed that GB’s non-electric gas demand was 23 bcm for 90 days of 
winter and 51 GW of installed wind generation was connected to the GB electricity 
network.  The generation capacities and non-electric gas demand for the GB system 
were taken from the 2015 Future Energy Scenarios (FES) published by the National 
Grid [31]. These assumptions reflect a situation when GB’s environmental and low 
carbon energy targets are met by 2030 [114]. 
 
Gas demand  for individual countries in Continental Europe was taken from the 
ENSTOG Ten Year Network Development Plan (TYNDP) [18]. The gas demand 
obtained from individual countries in Continental Europe was aggregated. This value 
is 136 tcm over 90 days. Using 2009/2010 daily demand data obtained from several 
TSO websites and other available sources, a daily demand profile was generated for 
each country to reflect similar weather conditions across Europe in both scenarios 
[115],[116]. 
 
4.3.2 Slow Transition Scenario  
The Slow Transition Scenario assumed a higher non-electric gas demand of 27 bcm 
and lower wind generation capacity of 41GW in GB than in the Reference Scenario 
(see Table 4.1). Gas demand in continental Europe remained unchanged in this 
scenario. 
 
4.3.3 Cases 
For each scenario, two cases were defined based on the loss of Ukraine transit capacity 
for 90 days of winter. The results of the case study conducted in chapter 3 showed that 
the 30-day loss of the Ukraine transit capacity has no adverse impact on gas supply in 
GB.  Therefore, the duration of the impact of the supply disruption was analysed for 
90 days to assess the resilience of the GB gas and electricity networks to a prolonged 
loss of a major gas supply source in Europe. 
 
 No Loss Case: The loss of Ukraine transit capacity is not applied in this case and the 
total capacity of Russian import pipelines to Europe is 687 mcm/d (see Table 4.1).  
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Loss Case: This is the case when the loss of the Ukraine transit capacity (386 mcm/d 
interconnector capacity between Ukraine to Europe) occurred.  
 
4.3.4 Modelling Assumptions  
The following assumptions were applied in modelling the scenarios:  
1. In both scenarios, LNG supply to Europe was assumed to be limited due to 
severe winter conditions in other major LNG importing countries.  
 
2. Modelling of the scenarios did not consider all contractual constraints, like take 
or pay obligations and other typical contractual arrangements of gas trade. This 
is because, contractual prices are not generally known but are usually 
confidential therefore the optimisation was based on estimations of border 
prices. 
 
3. All storage facilities except Germany and Netherlands were assumed to be 
available at 80% of maximum working gas capacity at the beginning of the 
winter. 
 
4. German and Dutch storage were assumed to be available at 70% of their 
maximum working capacities due to the limited access to these storage supplies 
as a result of their existing long-term contractual arrangements.  
 
4.3.5 Input Data for GB Gas and Electricity Networks in the 
CGEN Model  
The GB daily electricity demand profile for the Reference and Slow Transition 
scenarios was derived from historical winter electricity consumption data for 
2009/2010 and scaled to 2030 values obtained from 2015 FES [117]. Wind generation 
data of January-March 2010 was scaled up to 2030 values of wind power capacity 
obtained from 2015 FES in the Reference Scenario and in the Slow Transition 
Scenario.  
The electricity demand and wind generation profiles are shown in Figures 4.4 and 4.5. 
The Reference Scenario has a total generation capacity of 130.5 GW and the Slow 
Transition Scenario has a generation capacity of 120.5 GW. The capacities of the 
different generation technologies at each bus and the transmission line capacities are 
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provided in Appendix E. The electricity generation cost for the different technologies 
are provided in Appendix E. 
 
Figure 4.4 GB daily electricity demand  
 
Figure 4.5 GB daily wind generation 
 
GB gas demand was split into non-electric demand and gas demand for power 
generation.  In both scenarios, the non-electric demand profiles were derived from 
historical winter demand data for 2009/2010 including a peak winter day. The wind 
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demand data for March was increased by 20% to reflect a period of prolonged high 
gas demand towards the end of winter. The demand profiles of GB non-electric gas 
demand are shown in Figure 4.6 [27]. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure  4.6 GB non-electric gas demand profiles  
 
The maximum daily gas supply capacity at individual gas terminals and maximum 
daily capacity at each GB storage facility were obtained from National Grid Gas Ten 
Year statement are presented in Appendix E.  The cost data for GB network parameters 
are provided in Appendix E. 
 
4.3.6 Input Data for the EGN Model  
European supply data includes indigenous production, LNG and pipeline import 
sources - Russia, Norway, Libya, Algeria and Azerbaijan (see Fig 4.2). Based on 
historical winter supply, the gas supply from pipeline import sources and LNG import 
was increased by 10% to obtain the maximum  daily available supply [101]. The 
maximum daily supply potential and costs of gas supply for the various supply sources 
is given in Appendix C.  
Maximum daily capacities of existing interconnectors, LNG and storage facilities were 
taken from databases compiled by the Gas Infrastructure Europe [118], [47], [25]. In 
addition, capacities of planned projects identified as key infrastructure required to 
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improve supply diversification and the full integration of the European gas network 
were implemented in this study [119].  The cost data for gas transport via 
interconnectors and storage facilities are provided in Appendix C. 
 
4.4 Result of the Reference Scenario  
4.4.1 Impact of the Supply Disruption on Gas Supply in 
Continental Europe  
Figure 4.7 presents average daily gas supply volumes to Continental Europe from 
domestic and import sources in the Reference Scenario over 90 winter days from Jan 
- Mar 
Figure 4.7 EU domestic gas supplies and imported gas supply over 90 days – 
Reference Scenario  
Domestic supplies are composed of domestic production and gas withdrawn from 
storage facilities in Continental Europe. In the No Loss Case, average domestic 
production was 127 mcm/d while storage withdrawals contributed 533 mcm/d. Russia 
supplied the largest volume of imported gas of 500 mcm/d to Europe while the volume 
of LNG supplied was 241 mcm/d. 
 
The loss of Ukraine transit capacity led to a 43% decrease in Russian gas export to 
Europe compared to the No Loss Case. The supply shortfall was primarily 
compensated by higher storage withdrawals.  Storage withdrawals increased by 120 
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mcm/d in the Loss Case relative to the No Loss Case. LNG import increased from 241 
mcm/d in the No Loss Case to peak at 251 mcm/d in the Loss Case due to limited 
available supply. Norwegian gas import only made an additional supply of 12.7 mcm/d 
in the Loss Case to reach its maximum supply capacity due to a cold winter condition 
in Continental Europe.   
 
4.4.2 Impact of the Supply Disruption on the Operation of GB Gas 
Network  
Figure 4.8 presents the total volume of gas supplied from different supply sources to 
the GB gas network over 90 days in the Reference Scenario.  
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Figure 4.8 GB domestic gas supply and import volumes – Reference Scenario  
(BBL is the pipeline interconnector between GB and the Netherlands and IUK is the gas pipeline interconnector between GB and 
Belgium) 
 
GB domestic gas production contributed just 18% of total GB gas supplies in the No 
Loss Case due to dwindling gas production capacity in the UK continental shelf.  On 
the other hand, imported gas supply from LNG and Norway provided 56% of total GB 
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gas supply.  Norwegian import to GB decreased by 643 mcm (10%) in the Loss Case 
over the 90-day period when compared to the No Loss Case. The gas supply shortfall 
led to high gas prices in Continental Europe which attracted more Norwegian gas 
import to the Continent instead of GB. In order to replace some of the missing gas 
supply volume in Continental Europe, gas imported to GB on the BBL and IUK 
pipelines (Continental supplies) decreased by 531 mcm (9%) in the Loss Case 
compared to the No Loss Case. 
 
However, gas withdrawn from GB storage facilities increased by 300 mcm (9%) in the 
Loss Case to offset some of the supply shortfall. The supply disruption did not result 
in unserved gas demand in GB because there was a corresponding reduction of natural 
gas consumption in power generation to counterbalance the supply shortage. (This is 
discussed in section 4.4.3). 
 
 
Figure 4.9 Linepack utilisation – Reference Scenario 
 
The system linepack for the Reference Scenario is shown in Figure 4.9.  The system 
linepack maintained a nearly smooth profile with slight variations in the No Loss Case. 
In the Loss Case, steep drops in the level of linepack occurred on days 17, 41, and 77 
while the largest change in linepack of 32 mcm was noted on day 77.  Large depletion 
of system linepack occurred when peak demand in the gas network coincided with low 
wind generation in the electricity network. Gas-fired generation was frequently used 
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to compensate for the variation in wind power output leading to an increase in total 
gas consumption in the gas network.  
 
Table 4.2 Total compressor power consumption – Reference Scenario  
 
Slow Transition Scenario  Average Compressor Power (MW) 
No Loss Case  96 
Loss Case 66 
 
Average compressor power consumption over 90 days for the Reference Scenario is 
shown in Table 4.2. In the No Loss Case, extensive compressor power was used to 
transport imported gas supply at GB terminals to long distance demand locations 
across the network.  In addition, compressor power was also used to manage line pack 
fluctuation in a system supporting significant capacity of wind power generation.  
In the Loss Case, compressor power consumption decreased by 30% in comparison to 
the No Loss Case due to less imported gas supply at terminals (i.e. Bacton and 
Easington). Consequently, rapid depletion of the linepack contributed to balancing the 
gas network during periods of low wind generation. 
 
4.4.3 Impact of the Supply Disruption in GB Electricity Network  
GB power generation from different generation technologies is presented in Figure 
4.10. In the No Loss Case, nuclear plants supplied 11TWh of base load generation 
over the 90 day-period. Power generation from gas-fired generators was 39 TWh while 
38 TWh of electricity came from wind power generators. The substantial gas-fired 
generation was attributed to two factors. CCGT generators could attract surplus gas 
supplies due to low non-electric gas demand in the gas network. Furthermore, the 
variation in wind power generation was largely compensated by CCGT power 
generation.  
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Figure 4.10 GB power generation – Reference Scenario  
 
However, gas-fired generation declined by 7 TWh (18%) in the Loss Case. Higher 
power output from Other generators (waste, dual fuel and oil) was used to compensate 
for the reduction in gas-fired generation. Imported electricity through interconnectors 
had negligible contribution toward total power generation due to the availability of 
other lower cost electricity generators in the electricity generation mix. 
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4.5 Results of the Slow Transition Scenario  
In this section, the simulation results focus mainly on the impact of the loss of Ukraine 
transit capacity on the operation of GB gas and electricity networks.  
 
4.5.1 Impact of the Supply Disruption on the Operation of GB Gas 
Network  
The impact of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity on GB gas supplies in the Slow 
Transition Scenario is shown in Figure 4.11.  
 
Figure 4.11 GB domestic gas supply and import volumes – Slow Transition Scenario  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Ja
n
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
7
Ja
n
-2
1
Ja
n
-2
5
Ja
n
-2
9
Fe
b
-0
2
Fe
b
-0
6
Fe
b
-1
0
Fe
b
-1
4
Fe
b
-1
8
Fe
b
-2
2
Fe
b
-2
6
M
ar
-0
2
M
ar
-0
6
M
ar
-1
0
M
ar
-1
4
M
ar
-1
8
M
ar
-2
2
M
ar
-2
6
M
ar
-3
0
G
as
  s
u
p
p
ly
 v
o
lu
m
e 
(m
cm
/d
) 
Days
GB Domestic production GB LNG IUK
BBL Norweign gas Storage
Qshed Demand
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
450
Ja
n
-0
1
Ja
n
-0
5
Ja
n
-0
9
Ja
n
-1
3
Ja
n
-1
7
Ja
n
-2
1
Ja
n
-2
5
Ja
n
-2
9
Fe
b
-0
2
Fe
b
-0
6
Fe
b
-1
0
Fe
b
-1
4
Fe
b
-1
8
Fe
b
-2
2
Fe
b
-2
6
M
ar
-0
2
M
ar
-0
6
M
ar
-1
0
M
ar
-1
4
M
ar
-1
8
M
ar
-2
2
M
ar
-2
6
M
ar
-3
0
G
as
 s
u
p
p
ly
 v
o
lu
m
e 
(m
cm
/d
) 
Days
b). Loss Case  
a).  No Loss Case 
Chapter 4      Integrating Models of the European Gas Network and Great Britain’s Energy Networks  
 
 
 
73 
 
  
The supply shortfall resulted in a sudden decline in LNG and Norwegian gas supplies 
between days 61-70. LNG supply decrease by 20% while Norwegian gas decreased by 
30% compared to the condition when no supply disruption occurred (Fig 4.12). The 
supply disruption combined with limited LNG supply to Europe led to the rapid 
depletion of gas storage stocks in continental Europe. Consequently, LNG and 
Norwegian supplies were diverted away from GB to Continental Europe.  
 
Additional storage withdrawals of 253 mcm from GB storage facilities was used to 
compensate for the supply shortfall during this period (days 61-70). However, storage 
supplies were not sufficient to prevent unserved gas demand from day 39 to day 90. 
The results of the study showed that only the large industrial customers were adversely 
affected by unserved gas demand. A study conducted by London Economics on the 
estimating the value of lost load among gas consumers in GB suggested that the 
economic cost of unserved gas demand to the industrial sector could be substantial due 
to loss of production output or even damage to plant and equipment. For instance, the 
study estimated that the cost of unserved gas demand to Iron and Steel industry could 
range between 4.9 £m/mcm – 6.3 £m/mcm [120].  
 
4.5.2 Impact of the Supply Disruption in GB Electricity Network  
Figure 4.12 presents power generation from different generation technologies in the 
Slow Transition Scenario. GB power generation was dominated by power supply from 
gas-fired plants (34 TWh) and Wind (31 TWh) over 90 days. Electricity 
interconnectors provided additional power supply on days (13,31,41,61) of high 
electricity demand and low wind generation. 
 
In the Loss Case, the gas supply shortage restricted gas delivery to gas-fired 
generators. As a result, gas-fired power output decreased by 30% (10 TWh) relative to 
No Loss Case. The reduction in gas-fired generation output was mostly replaced by 
higher electricity import via electricity interconnectors. This is due to the availability 
of a significant capacity of electricity interconnectors expected to come online in GB 
electricity network by 2030. Electricity interconnection between GB and multiple 
European countries is expected to play a key role in the diversification of GB power 
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generation mix, improve security of energy supply and support a large capacity of 
renewable generation.     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.12 GB power generation – Slow Transition Scenario 
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4.6 Summary 
An integrated optimisation model was developed from the European gas network 
(EGN) model and Combined Gas and Electricity Network model (CGEN) using the 
soft-link approach. This was used to determine the impact of the gas supply shocks in 
the European gas network on the operation of Great Britain’s gas and electricity 
networks. 
 
The model was applied to two different scenarios which depict the future evolution of 
GB energy system in 2030.  The Reference Scenario and the Slow Transition Scenario 
were defined for 90 days of cold winter condition combined with limited availability 
of LNG caused by a tight global LNG market in 2030. The loss of Ukraine transit 
capacity was implemented as a supply shock situation over 90 days in both scenarios. 
 
Due to the low gas demand assumed in the Reference Scenario, the loss of the Ukraine 
transit capacity had no significant effect on the operation of GB gas and electricity 
networks. The supply shortfall was compensated by GB storage withdrawals in the gas 
network and lower gas consumption in the electricity network. 
 
In the Slow Transition Scenario, the loss of Ukraine transit capacity resulted in gas 
supply shortfall in the GB gas network. Some of the missing gas volumes was replaced 
by higher withdrawal of gas storage volumes in GB and substitution of natural gas 
generation by electricity imports in the electricity network. However, the industrial 
sector experienced 20% of average daily demand curtailed (unserved gas demand). 
This was due to high gas demand assumed in this scenario. 
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Chapter 5  
5.Mitigation Options to Improve Security of Gas 
Supply to GB  
5.1 Introduction  
Since 2001, there has been significant expansion in the import capacity of the GB gas 
network to compensate for the continuing decline in domestic gas production. 
However, the analysis presented in Chapter 4 showed that the GB gas network will 
experience unserved gas demand when a high impact and low probability import 
supply disruption occurs over a prolonged period of time. The example investigated in 
this thesis is the loss of gas transit capacity through the Ukraine. 
 
For the study described in this Chapter, a Base Case was established with the following 
assumptions: 
1.  GB gas demand was derived from the Slow Progression Scenario of National 
Grid  2015 Future Energy Scenario [114]. 
2. LNG supply to Europe was assumed to be constrained to 300 mcm/d under a 
situation where global LNG demand exceeds available supply.   
The loss of the Ukraine transit capacity was applied to the Base Case for a period of 
90 days.  
 
Six mitigation Options were identified to improve the security of GB gas supply [30]. 
The mitigation Options are presented in Figure 5.1. The mitigation options are broadly 
grouped into three Measures. 
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Figure 5.1 Classification of mitigation options  
 
A cost-benefit assessment of the mitigation options was conducted in two stages. 
Firstly, the integrated EGN-CGEN model (presented in Chapter 4) was used to 
calculate the level of unserved gas demand in the GB gas network, electricity 
generation and the total operational costs for the different mitigation options. Then, 
the Net Present Value (NPV) of the cost of avoiding unserved gas demand for each 
mitigation option was calculated using an Excel spreadsheet. 
  
5.2 Description of Mitigation Options  
5.2.1 Additional Gas Import Volume from the Caspian Region  
The 2015 BP Statistical Review of Energy estimated that Caspian region has 18.4 tcm 
of natural gas reserves (mainly in Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan) [121]. These gas 
reserves can be assessed by the European Union through pipeline imports. The large 
amount of gas reserves suggests the potential for future increase in gas export capacity 
from the Caspian region to the EU.  
 
The Trans Anatolian Natural Gas Pipeline (TANAP) Project which is currently under 
construction, will deliver up to 16bcm/y of Caspian gas supplies through Turkey to 
South East Europe by 2018 [122]. The pipeline capacity is expected to increase to 31 
bcm/y by 2026 [122]. The proposed expansion of the pipeline capacity would 
contribute to increasing security of EU gas supply. 
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5.2.2 Nord Stream II Pipeline Project  
The Nord Stream pipeline project comprised two off-shore pipelines that runs from 
Vybord in Russia to Greifswald in Germany through the Baltic Sea. The pipelines were 
commissioned in 2012 and have a total annual capacity of 55 bcm [123]. The pipelines 
transport Russian gas directly to Germany in North-West Europe. This project made a 
significant contribution to security of gas supply in Europe by the reduction of Russian 
gas flow via Ukraine from 80% to 50% [124].  
 
In 2015, a joint venture was launched between Gazprom Russia and five European 
companies to extend the capacity of the existing Nord Stream pipelines from 55 
bcm/year to 110 bcm/year by the addition of two parallel pipelines [43]. The proposed 
project would increase security of GB gas supply by enabling gas consumers in North 
West Europe and Central Europe to completely avoid gas transportation through non-
EU transit countries (Ukraine and Belarus).  
 
5.2.3 Shale Gas Development in GB  
The recent discovery of significant shale gas resources in England has attracted 
interests from policy makers and investors. Estimates of the gas in place ranges 
between 23.3 tcm and 64.6 tcm [125]. Gas in place is an estimate of the total volume 
of shale gas that exists in any shale formation before any development takes place 
[126]. The development of GB’s shale gas resources will depend on a supportive 
government policy and regulatory framework, access to low risk financing and good 
public acceptance [127].    
 
Several studies have investigated the prospects for shale gas development in GB [128], 
with a focus on the process of shale gas extraction [129], the economic impact of shale 
gas development on GB [130] and the environmental impact of shale gas exploitation 
[131]. According to 2014 National Grid Future Energy Scenario, shale gas production 
is expected to contribute up to 31 bcm per year by 2030 [114]. This shale gas 
production capacity would reduce import dependency from 75% to 35% by 2030 and 
represents about 40% of the projected gas demand in 2030 [114].  
 
Chapter 5                                                  Mitigation Options to Improve Security of Gas Supply to GB   
 
 
 
79 
 
  
5.2.4 Additional Storage Capacity in GB  
Gas storage facilities provide additional supply on the GB gas network during supply 
disruptions and the supply flexibility required to meet short term gas demand 
variations.  [27]. 
 
GB gas storage facilities are grouped into long range, medium range and short range 
storage facilities as shown in Table 5.1. The aggregated capacity of gas storage 
facilities in GB is 4.6 bcm. In 2014, gas storage facilities provided about 6% of total 
GB gas demand (75.5 bcm/year) [27]. 
  
The only long range storage facility connected to the GB gas network is the Rough 
storage facility located off the cost of East Yorkshire. The Rough storage represents 
70% of GB’s total gas storage capacity [132]. The facility is an off-shore depleted gas 
field used mainly for seasonal storage as natural gas is injected in the summer and 
withdrawn in winter. Medium range storage comprises fast cycle facilities that have 
the capability to provide several cycles of gas injection into storage and withdrawal 
from storage within a year.  The short-range storage is used to meet sudden increase 
in demand over a short period of time. The Avonmouth LNG peak shaving facility is 
the only short-range storage facility in GB [133].   
 
Table 5.1 Characteristics of existing GB gas storage facilities [27] 
 
Storage facilities  Working gas volume 
(bcm) 
Maximum withdrawal 
rate (mcm/d) 
Long range  3.3 41 
Medium range  1.22 100 
Short range  0.08 13 
Total   4.6 154 
 
 
5.2.5 Industrial & Commercial Interruptible Demand  
Demand side measures are tools used by network operators to reduce or curtail the gas 
demand of large Industrial and Commercial (I&C) consumers during a situation of gas 
Chapter 5                                                  Mitigation Options to Improve Security of Gas Supply to GB   
 
 
 
80 
 
  
supply shortage. Industrial and commercial customers can enter into contract with 
system operators or gas shippers to interrupt their gas supply for a number of days 
every year in exchange for a discount or fee. Alternatively, a payment is offered to 
eligible industrial and commercial consumers to bid to reduce their gas consumption 
at periods of gas supply emergencies. 
 
The current level of demand side response provided by large industrial and commercial 
consumers in the UK is estimated as 3 mcm/day [134]. This is because previous 
regulatory arrangement offered limited incentive for the voluntary participation of 
industrial and commercial to provide demand side response. The compensation offered 
to I&C customers to reduce or curtail their gas demand during a gas supply emergency 
did not reflect the true cost of interruption of their gas supplies [134]. 
 
In 2014, Ofgem proposed a demand response auction to incentivise industrial and 
commercial consumers to offer demand side response during periods of gas supply 
shortage [135].  This would ensure that the responding customers receive appropriate 
payment when their gas supplies are interrupted to support investment in back-up 
capacity. 
 
5.2.6 Fuel Switching in Power Generation  
Gas-fired generators equipped with dual fuel capacity can switch to distillate fuel to 
generate power during periods of high gas prices or when there is a need to curtail their 
demand in the event of a gas supply emergency. CCGTs with distillate back-up 
capacity have lower efficiency, high maintenance cost and occupy more space than 
CCGTs without distillate back-up capacity [136]. 
 
In the UK, the installed capacity of CCGT equipped with distillate back-up capacity 
reduced from 8103 MW in 2010 to 2165 MW in 2014 [134]. This is due to the shutting 
down of ageing CCGT generators equipped with distillate back-up capacity and 
limited investment in new CCGT equipped with dual fuel capability. The development 
of additional CCGT with distillate back-up capacity will depend on the UK capacity 
market.  
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The UK capacity market is a mechanism designed to make payments to generation 
stations based on their generation capacity.  The capacity market would ensure 
adequate levels of power generation capacity as increasing generation from renewable 
energy sources result in the reduction of CCGT operating hour (i.e. lower capacity 
factor) coupled with the decline of coal generation capacity on the network.  
The payment made to capacity providers is to encourage new build power plants 
especially CCGT generators. The participation of dual fuel CCGT generators in the 
capacity market will increase reliability of power supply during periods of limited gas 
supply in the GB gas network. 
 
5.3 Data Assumptions of the Mitigation Options  
The modelling assumptions of the different mitigation options are summarised in 
Table 5.2.  
 
Table 5.2 Capacities of the mitigation options  
 
Mitigation 
Options 
Type of 
Measure 
Implementation  Location 
 
Caspian 
Supply 
 
EU Gas 
Supply 
Measure 
Interconnection capacity between 
Azerbaijan and Greece via Turkey 
increased from 43.8 mcm/d to 85 
mcm/d.   
European  
Gas Network 
model  
Nord 
Stream 
Interconnection capacity between   
Russia and Germany increased from 
150 mcm/d to 225 mcm/d. 
European  
Gas Network 
model 
Shale gas 
production 
GB Gas 
Supply 
Measure 
 
Shale gas production capacity of 20 
mcm/d is applied at a supply node in 
the GB gas network.  
Combined 
Gas and 
Electricity 
Network 
Model  
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Additional 
storage 
capacity 
Two salt cavity storage nodes were 
defined individually in the GB gas 
network. Each node was modelled with 
the following data set:  
Working gas volume: 500 mcm 
Max. injection rate: 20 mcm/d  
Max. withdrawal rate: 20 mcm/ d   
Combined 
Gas and 
Electricity 
Network 
Model 
Interruptible 
demand 
GB 
Demand 
Measure 
 Interruptible demand was applied in 
the GB gas network by allowing (I&C) 
gas demand to be curtailed. The 
maximum interruptible demand 
capacity is 20 mcm/d.   
Combined 
Gas and 
Electricity 
Network 
Model 
Fuel 
Switching 
GB 
Demand 
Measure 
4 GW of existing CCGT generators 
were modelled to have dual fuel 
capacity. The variable cost of distillate 
generation was assumed to be 65 
£/MWh.   
Combined 
Gas and 
Electricity 
Network 
Model 
 
5.4 Modelling of the Mitigation Options 
5.4.1 EU Gas Supply Measures 
The mitigation options in Europe (EU Gas Supply Measures) are the Caspian Supply 
Case and the Nord Stream Case. These mitigation options are implemented using:  
 Step 1 Input the capacity of the mitigation option in the EU gas network (see 
Table 5.2) 
  Step 2 Run the EU gas network model for 90 days. 
 Step 3 Obtain the gas flows on interconnectors between GB and continental 
Europe. 
 Step 4  Input the gas flows on interconnectors obtained from the EGN model 
into the CGEN model. 
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 Step 5  Run the CGEN model for 90 days to calculate the level of unserved gas 
demand, cost of unserved gas demand and the operational cost of the GB gas 
and electricity networks.   
The cost of unserved gas is calculated by multiplying the volume of unserved gas 
demand by the value of lost load (VOLL). The assumed VOLL for the various 
categories of natural gas consumers is presented in Appendix E.  
 
5.4.2 GB Gas Supply Measures 
The mitigation options in UK (grouped under the GB Gas Supply Measures) are the 
Shale Gas Case and the Additional Storage Case. These mitigation options are 
implemented in the CGEN model (see Table 5.2). The modelling steps are: 
 Step 1  Input the capacity of the mitigation option in the CGEN model.  
 Step 2  Run the CGEN model for 90 days to calculate the level of unserved gas 
demand, cost of unserved gas demand and the operational cost of the GB gas 
and electricity networks.  
 
5.4.3 GB Gas Demand Measures  
The mitigation options grouped under GB Gas Demand Measures are the Interruptible 
Demand case and Fuel Switching case. These mitigation options are implemented in 
the CGEN model. The mitigation options are modelled using the same modelling steps 
described for the GB gas supply measures in subsection 5.4.2. 
 
5.5 Cost-Benefit Analysis of the Mitigation Options  
A cost-benefit analysis is used to determine the economic value of the mitigation 
options proposed to improve security of gas supply to GB.  The cost of reducing 
unserved gas demand (i.e. benefit) is compared against the implementation cost of 
each mitigation option. The structure of the cost benefit analysis is presented in Figure 
5.2. 
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The reduced cost of unserved gas demand is calculated as the difference between the 
cost of unserved gas demand with and without the mitigation option. As the mitigation 
options decreases the cost of unserved gas demand to GB, the security of supply 
benefits to GB increases. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.2 Structure of the cost-benefit analysis study 
 
5.5.1 Data Assumptions for the Cost Benefit Analysis  
The cost-benefit analysis is calculated using a Microsoft Office Excel spreadsheet. A 
summary of the inputs to the spreadsheet tool is presented in Table 5.3. 
 
Table 5.3 Inputs to the cost-benefit analysis spreadsheet 
 
Mitigation Options Asset life 
(Years) 
Discount rate (%) Implementation 
Cost (£m)   
Caspian Supply Case 35 10% 0 
Nord Stream Case 35 10% 0 
Shale Gas Case 30 10% 548[137] 
Additional Storage Case 30 10% 550 [30] 
Reduced cost of unserved 
gas demand for each 
mitigation option calculated 
by the EU-CGEN model
Capital cost of the mitigation 
options
Cost-Benefit Analysis 
Spreadsheet
 (MS-EXCEL)
Net- benefit of the reduced 
cost of unserved gas demand 
of the mitigation options 
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Interruptible Demand Case 15 3.5% 18[138] 
Fuel Switching Case 25 10% 210 [136] 
 
The asset life here refers to the duration of time the mitigation option was put into use 
(operational). The time taken to complete the construction of the mitigation option is 
not considered in this study. 
 
A commercial discount rate of 10% is assumed for all mitigation options except the 
Interruptible Demand Case (see Table 5.3). A social discount rate of 3.5% is assumed 
for Interruptible Demand Case in line with the social discount rate used in the UK for    
public sector projects implemented by the government or the transmission system 
operator [134]. 
 
Gas supply disruptions are considered as high impact and low probability events. The 
probability of a supply disruption gives an indication of how often the supply 
disruption would occur over a time period. According to a study conducted by the 
Centre on Regulation in Europe, the probability of a supply disruption and the impact 
on gas consumers when its occurs, provides a useful measure of security of supply 
[139].  
 
The annual probability of an outage of Ukraine transit capacity occurring during a 
period of limited LNG supply to Europe over 90 days was assumed as 2% (i.e. 2- in -
100-year chance) [140].  
 
5.5.2 Implementation Cost 
The cost of implementing each mitigation option as presented in Table 5.3. The 
implementation cost of mitigation options that involve the construction of physical 
infrastructure is limited to the capital cost of the project. The capital cost values were 
taken from various sources reported in literature.  The potential development of the 
Nord Stream and Caspian gas supply projects would be at no cost to the GB gas 
consumers since they have not direct interconnection with the GB gas network. Hence 
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these mitigation options have zero capital cost.  The interruptible demand option has 
no capital cost because it is assumed to operate as a commercial arrangement between 
the industrial gas consumers and the system transmission operator. Instead, the 
implementation cost covers the start-up cost and cost of participation for customers. 
 
5.5.3 Benefit 
The reduced cost of unserved gas demand for a given mitigation option with respect 
to the Base Case is shown in Equation 5.1: 
 
𝑃𝑉_𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑂 =∑𝑃𝑟𝑡 
𝐶𝑈𝐷𝐵𝐶 − 𝐶𝑈𝐷𝑀𝑂
(1 + 𝑑𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡 𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑒)𝑡
 
𝑛
𝑡=1
 5.1 
 
where 𝑃𝑉_𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑂 is the present value of the reduced cost of unserved gas demand for 
a given mitigation option, 𝑃𝑟𝑡 is the probability of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity 
in any given year,  𝑛 is the asset life, 𝑡 is time in years, 𝐶𝑈𝐷𝐵𝐶 is the cost of unserved 
gas in the Base Case, 𝐶𝑈𝐷𝑀𝑂 is cost of unserved gas due to the implementation of the 
mitigation option.  
5.5.4 Net Benefit  
The net benefit is the present value of the benefit less the implementation cost of the 
mitigation option as shown in Equation 5.2.  
 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑂 = 𝑃𝑉_𝑅𝐶𝑀𝑂 − 𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑂 5.2 
 
where 𝑁𝑃𝑉𝑀𝑂 is the net present value of the benefit derived from a given mitigation 
option and  𝐶𝐶𝑀𝑂 is the implementation cost of the given mitigation option. 
 
5.6 Simulation Results  
The six (6) mitigation options were modelled to demonstrate their effectiveness on the 
security of gas supply to GB, during a loss of the Ukraine transit capacity over 90 days 
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in winter. The simulation results of the mitigation options were compared to the Base 
Case.  
5.6.1 Results of EU Gas Supply Measures  
Table 5.4 presents the level of unserved gas demand, cost of unserved gas demand and 
the operational cost of the GB gas and electricity networks in the Base Case, Caspian 
Supply Case and Nord Stream Case.  
 
The operational cost of the gas network includes the cost of gas import and gas 
production, storage operation and change in linepack. Operational cost of the 
electricity network comprises the cost of power generated from the different 
generation technologies.  
 
Table 5.4 Unserved gas demand and operational costs for EU gas supply measures 
   
Results  Base Case Caspian Supply 
Case 
Nord Stream 
Case 
Unserved gas demand 
over 90 days (mcm) 
1159 124.3 0 
Cost of unserved gas 
demand (£m) 
5096 307 0 
Operational cost of 
gas network (£m) 
2337 3469 3396 
Operational cost of 
electricity network 
(£m) 
2082 2003 1532 
Total operational cost 
(£m) 
9515 5779 4928 
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Over the 90-day period, the level of unserved gas decreased from 1159 mcm in the 
Base Case to 123.3 mcm in the Caspian Supply Case and with the Nord Stream Case, 
unserved gas demand was totally eliminated. The cost of unserved gas demand 
decreased from £5096 million during the Base Case to £307 million in the Caspian 
Supply Case, and further reduced to zero in the Nord Stream Case. 
 
In the Caspian supply case, the reduction in unserved gas demand and cost of unserved 
gas demand was due to higher gas import from the Caspian region to Southern Europe 
which minimised the demand for LNG supplies in Continental Europe during the 
supply disruption.  
 
For the Nord Stream Case, the additional Nord stream pipeline capacity was used to 
reroute Russian gas supply via Germany to the EU in order to bypass the Ukraine 
transit pipeline. This resulted in greater gas import to the GB gas network via the two 
gas interconnectors between GB and continental Europe (IUK & BBL) and prevented 
unserved gas demand in GB.   
 
The operational cost of the gas network increased by 48% in the Caspian Supply Case 
and 45% in the Nord Stream Case compared to the Base Case. This was due to the 
availability of higher volumes of imported gas from the Continent to GB during the 
supply disruption.  
 
 
Chapter 5                                                  Mitigation Options to Improve Security of Gas Supply to GB   
 
 
 
89 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 GB Power generation from different technologies for EU gas supply 
measures over 90 days  
 
Figure 5.3 shows GB power generation from different technologies for the Base Case, 
the Caspian Supply Case and the Nord Stream Case. In the Caspian Supply Case, 
CCGT generation increased by only 3% (0.9 TWh) with respect to the Base Case, due 
to the limited gas supply in the gas network. 
 
 In the Nord Stream Case, CCGT increased by 28% (7 TWh) with respect to the Base 
Case due to the additional supply of low cost gas to CCGT generators in the electricity 
network. As a result, electricity imports from electricity interconnectors decreased by 
48% (4.5 TWh) compared to the Base Case.  
 
The slight increase in gas delivery to the electricity network in the Caspian Supply 
Case resulted in a 3% (£79 million) reduction in the operational cost of GB electricity 
network compared to the Base Case. In the Nord Stream Case, CCGT power 
generation displaced expensive electricity import via interconnectors resulting in a 
26% (£550 million) reduction in the operational cost of the electricity network 
compared to the Base Case. 
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The total operational cost decreased from £9515 million in the Base Case to £5779 
million in the Caspian Supply Case and further reduced to £4928 million in the Nord 
Stream Case. 
 
5.6.2 Results of GB supply measures  
Table 5.5 presents the volume of unserved gas demand and the operational cost of the 
GB gas and electricity network in the Base Case, the Shale Gas Case and Additional 
Storage Case. 
 
Table 5.5 Unserved gas demand and operational costs for EU gas supply measures 
over 90 days    
 
Results  Base Case Shale Gas 
Case 
Additional 
Storage Case 
Unserved gas demand 
(mcm) 
1159 13 119 
Cost of unserved gas 
demand (£m) 
5096 32 294 
Operational cost of gas 
network 
(£m) 
2337 3550 3434 
Operational cost of 
electricity network (£m) 
2082 1702 1934 
Total operational cost of 
the integrated network 
(£m) 
9515 5284 5662 
 
The level of unserved gas demand decreased from 1159 mcm in the Base Case to 13 
mcm in the Shale Gas Case and 119 mcm in the Additional Storage Case. Similarly, 
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the cost of unserved gas demand decreased from £5096 million to £32 million in the 
Shale Gas Case and £294 million in the Additional Storage Case. 
 
 In the Shale Gas Case, the reduction in the volume of unserved gas demand was due 
to higher output from GB domestic gas production. In the Additional Storage Case, 
the reduction in the volume of unserved gas was due to the availability of higher 
volume of stored gas in GB storage facilities compared with the Base Case. 
 
Figure 5.4. GB power generation from different technologies for GB gas supply 
measures over 90 days 
 
Figure 5.4 shows GB power generation from different technologies for the Base Case, 
Shale gas Case and Additional Storage Case. In the Shale Gas Case, CCGT generation 
increased by 21% relative to the Base Case due to the availability of higher gas supply 
to CCGT generators. As a result, power imported via electricity interconnectors to GB 
decreased by 35% compared to the Base Case. On the other hand, CCGT generation 
increased by 8% in the Additional Storage Case relative to the Base due to a slight 
increase in the volume of gas supplied to CCGT generators. Consequently, operational 
cost of the electricity network reduced by 19% in the Shale Gas Case and by only 9% 
in the Additional Storage Case compared to the Base Case.  
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The total operational cost of the integrated gas and electricity network decreased from 
£9515 million in the Base Case to £5824 million in the Shale Gas Case and to £5662 
in the Additional Storage Case. 
 
5.6.3 GB Gas Demand Measures  
The level of unserved gas demand, cost of unserved gas demand and the operational 
costs of GB gas and electricity networks for the Base Case, Interruptible Demand Case 
and Fuel Switching Case are shown in Table 5.6.   
 
Table 5.6 Unserved gas demand and operational costs for GB gas demand measures 
over 90 days 
 
Results  Base Case Interruptible 
Demand Case 
Fuel 
Switching 
Case 
Unserved gas demand 
(mcm) 
1159 473 492 
Cost of unserved gas 
demand (£m) 
5096 1168 1391 
Operational cost of gas 
network (£m) 
2337 4370 3627 
Operational cost of 
electricity network (£m) 
2082 1989 2352 
Total operational cost of 
the integrated network 
(£m) 
9515 7527 7370 
 
The level of unserved gas demand in GB decreased from 1159 mcm in the Base Case 
to 473 mcm in the Interruptible Demand Case and 492 mcm in the Fuel Switching 
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Case over the 90-day period. The cost of unserved gas reduced from £5096 million in 
the Base Case to £1168 million in the Interruptible Demand Case and £1391 million 
in the Fuel Switching Case. 
 
The operational cost of the GB gas network increased by 80% in the Interruptible 
Demand Case compared to the Base Case due to the high cost of interruptible demand 
(i.e. the payment made to I & C customers to curtail their gas consumption was 
assumed as 1.27 £/mcm) [133]. In the Fuel Switching Case, the operation cost of the 
gas network increased by 55% compared to the Base Case as lower gas demand in 
power generation made more gas volumes available to other gas consumers in the gas 
network.   
 
Figure 5.5 GB Power generation from different technologies due to the GB gas demand 
measures 
 
Figure 5.5 shows the Power generation from different technologies in the GB 
electricity network for the Base Case, Interruptible Demand Case and Fuel switching 
Case. 
 
CCGT generation increased by only 4% in the Interruptible Demand Case compared 
to the Base Case due to restricted gas supply to CCGT generators. The gas demand 
gas 
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response provided by Industrial & Commercial (I&C) customers was mainly used to 
minimise unserved gas demand in the gas network.  
 
In the Fuel Switching Case, gas-fired generation decreased by 21% compared to the 
Base Case due to the utilisation of distillate fuel (instead of natural gas) in CCGTs 
generators equipped with dual fuel capabilities. The reduction of gas utilisation in 
electricity generation, provided more gas volumes within the gas network to minimise 
the level of unserved gas demand. 
 
In the Interruptible Demand Case, the operational cost of the electricity network 
decreased by £93 million compared to the Base Case. However, the operational cost 
of the electricity network increased by £269 million in the Fuel Switching Case 
compared to the Base Case, due to higher power generation from expensive dual fuel 
CCGT generators. 
 
The total operational cost for the integrated gas and electricity network decreased by 
20.8% in the Interruptible Demand Case compared to the Base Case and 22.5% in the 
Fuel Switching Case compared to the Base Case. 
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5.7 Results of Cost Benefit Analysis 
Figure 5.6 shows the net present value (NPV) of the reduced cost of unserved gas 
demand for the six different mitigation options. The NPV gives an indication of the 
relative cost-effectiveness of the mitigation measures. 
 
Figure. 5.6 Net benefit of the mitigation options 
 
The Nord Stream Case had a highest positive NPV of £1.03 billion. The economic 
benefit derived from the Nord Stream Case is as a result of two factors. Firstly, the 
Nord Stream pipeline project provides an alternative route for Russian gas supply to 
the European Union. Hence the project allowed a complete by-pass of Russian gas 
transit through Ukraine and eliminated the source of the supply disruption.  
 
 Secondly GB bears no investment cost in this project, as GB pipeline interconnectors 
are not directly linked to the Nord Stream project. Gas imported through European 
interconnectors to GB can be received from multiple source including domestic gas 
production in Netherland and imports from Russia, Norway and North Africa and the 
Caspian. Therefore, it is difficult to determine precisely how much of Russian gas 
supply transported through the Nord Stream II project will reach GB. Nevertheless, 
the price of continental gas imported to GB will reflect gas transport tariff on the 
supply routes.  
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The Caspian Supply Case showed a positive NPV of £970 million as the net benefit 
of improving security of gas supply in GB. Here, the implementation of this mitigation 
option enabled higher import of Caspian gas supply to replace some of the missing 
Russian gas volumes in South East Europe. The implementation of this project 
enhanced the diversification of gas supply sources in South East Europe resulting in  
less reliance on Russia gas supply. In addition, cheap pipeline supplies displaced 
expensive stored gas and LNG supplies in Central and South Europe. Consequently, 
GB could access higher gas import from the continent Europe and Norway. In addition, 
the GB gas consumers do not incur any investment cost with regards to this project for 
the same reason presented in the Nord Stream Case.  
 
 The result showed that EU gas supply measure (Nord Stream Case and Caspian 
Supply Case) were the most cost-effective solutions for improving security of gas 
supply to GB in the event of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity in Continental Europe. 
 
The economic benefit derived from the Shale Gas Case decreased by 47% when 
compared to the Nord Stream Case.  This is due to the considerable capital cost 
involved in the exploitation and production of shale gas resources. This option 
significantly reduced unserved gas demand in GB as expensive domestic gas volumes 
replaced the missing imported gas supply from the Continent and other sources. Hence 
the benefits with regards to improving security of supply include a substantial cost.  
 
The Additional Storage Case showed the least economic benefit (NPV of £430 
million) to improve security of gas supply in GB. This was due to the high capital cost 
of gas storage facilities. In addition, the short-run marginal cost of storage utilisation 
(i.e withdrawal and injection) is very low compared to the capital cost. Hence the 
frequency of storage utilisation to mitigate gas supply disruptions influences its 
derived economic benefit. For example, if the annual probability of an outage of 
Ukraine transit capacity increased from 2% to 10% (see section 5.5.1) then the 
economic benefit of the Additional Storage Case increased from £430 million to £4.2 
billion (980%).  
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Investment in new gas production and storage facilities have other benefits besides 
mitigating unserved gas demand. Some benefits include peak gas demand reductions 
and supply flexibility to support renewable power generation in the electricity network. 
However, these benefits were not quantified within the scope of this study.  
 
For GB gas demand measures, the Interruptible Demand Case showed a positive NPV 
of £900 million while the Fuel Switching Case showed a positive NPV of £460 
million.  It was shown in the result that the Interruptible Demand Case would provide 
significant benefit to improving security of gas supply in GB. Although, the 
implementation of this option led to a 44% reduction in the volume of unserved gas 
demand, the corresponding cost of unserved gas demand decreased by 77%.  The large 
economic benefit of the option is mainly driven by the low cost of implementing this 
mechanism. 
 
5.8 Summary 
Six mitigation options to improve security of gas supply in GB were investigated. The 
mitigation options were modelled using the EGN-CGEN model to determine their 
impact on the level of unserved gas demand, cost of unserved gas demand, power 
generation and the cost of operating the combined GB gas and electricity network. A 
cost benefit analysis was conducted to determine the economic benefits of the 
mitigation options.  
 
The results showed that all the mitigation options brought about a considerable 
reduction in the level of unserved gas demand in GB. However, in the Nord Stream 
Case, unserved gas demand in GB was fully avoided leading to a significant decrease 
in operational cost of the gas and electricity network. Furthermore, the Nord Stream 
Case was showed to be the most cost-effective option to improve security of gas supply 
to GB when Russian gas supply through the Ukraine transit capacity was disrupted.  
 
It is important to note that investment decisions related to pipeline projects in 
Continental Europe are beyond the control of UK policy makers.  Hence, closer 
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regional cooperation among EU member states is essential to drive investment in 
pipeline projects that deliver indirect security of supply benefits to GB.  
 
It was shown that shale gas development and additional gas storage capacity 
significantly reduced the level of unserved gas demand in the GB gas network. 
Consequently, total operational cost of the GB gas and electricity network reduce by 
55% in the Shale Gas Case and 40% in the Additional Storage Case compared to the 
Base Case.  
 
However, the cost-benefit assessment showed that Interruptible Demand Case 
delivered greater economic benefit when compared with Shale Gas Development Case 
and Additional Gas Storage Capacity. This was due to the high capital costs associated 
with shale gas development and the construction of gas storage facilities. 
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Chapter 6  
6.Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction  
Security of gas supply risks in the European gas network were identified and their 
impact on the operation of the GB gas and electricity network investigated. A 
simplified model of the European gas network was developed to assess the effect of 
the loss of Russian gas supply through the Ukraine to Europe on gas demand and 
supply balance across EU member states.  In order to investigate the effect of disrupted 
gas supplies in Europe on the operation of the GB gas and electricity networks, a soft-
link approach was used to couple the European gas network model to the GB 
Combined Gas and Electricity Network (CGEN) model. Six measures to improve 
security of gas supply to GB were examined and their economic benefits were 
quantified. 
 
6.1.1 Impact of gas supply disruption on security of gas supply in 
Europe 
Recent events of gas supply disruptions in Europe have highlighted the limited 
capability of the European gas network to mitigate the impact of gas supply 
disruptions. A simplified European gas network was developed to investigate the effect 
of gas supply disruption on security of gas in Europe.   
 
A linear optimisation model of a simplified European gas network was developed to 
investigate natural gas flows within Europe. The objective function of the model was 
to minimise the total cost of gas supplied within Europe. The model represented all 
gas interconnectors including routes to major import sources, LNG terminals and 
storage facilities in Europe. Each country was represented by a node and country nodes 
were linked by the gas flows on cross-border interconnectors.  
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The simplified European gas network model was used to examine the effect of the loss 
of Ukraine transit capacity on Russian gas supply to Europe in the winter of 2014/15. 
A Reference Scenario and a High Demand Scenario were investigated. Also, the role 
of additional interconnector capacities and higher storage withdrawal rate as measures 
to mitigate the impact of the supply disruption were investigated.  
 
It was shown that the lost gas due the loss of Ukraine transit capacity was replaced 
mostly by LNG imports and gas stored in European storage facilities.  The loss of 
Ukraine transit capacity during a high gas demand period resulted in unserved gas 
demand to different gas consumers including the domestic sector in South East Europe.  
 
It was shown that this region was reliant on the Ukraine transit route and had limited 
alternative supply routes. The simulation result showed that additional capacities on 
selected interconnectors allowed the rerouting of Russian gas volume through 
Germany to South East Europe.  Higher storage withdrawal rate in selected countries 
was shown to reduce unserved gas in the South East Europe. 
 
6.1.2 Soft-linking models of the European gas network to the GB 
gas and electricity networks 
Natural gas account for approximately 25% of all energy supplies in the United 
Kingdom (UK). The rapid decline of UK’s domestic gas production has led to an 
increased dependence on gas import. The GB network receives imported gas in the 
form of LNG; and pipelines supplies from the Norwegian continental shelf and 
continental Europe via Belgium and Netherlands.  
 
A soft-link approach was used to couple the European Gas Network model (EGN) to 
the Combined Gas and Electricity Network model (CGEN). The soft-link method is 
summarised in the following steps:  
 The EGN was run to obtain gas flows on cross-border interconnectors between 
GB and Continental Europe and their corresponding gas supply prices.  
 The CGEN model was run with the gas flows on cross-border interconnectors 
between GB and Continental Europe and their corresponding gas supply 
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prices. The output of the CGEN model was the volume of gas consumed in 
power generation. 
  The total GB gas demand calculated from the summation of GB non-electric 
demand and the volume of gas consumed in power generation was transferred 
to the EGN model.  
 The EGN model is then re-run and the process is repeated until the exchanged 
variables reach convergence. 
The integrated EGN-CGEN model was used to analyse the impact of the loss of 
Ukraine transit capacity on the operation of GB gas and electricity network over 90 
winter days in 2030 for a Reference Scenario and a Slow Transition Scenario.  
 
 The Reference Scenario assumed a low non-electric gas demand and high wind 
generation capacity in GB while the Slow Transition Scenario assumed a high non-
electric demand for gas and low wind generation capacity in GB. It was shown that in 
the Reference Scenario, the supply shortfall to the GB as a result of the loss of Ukraine 
transit capacity was replaced by gas withdrawn from GB gas storage and a reduction 
in the amount of gas use by CCGTs in power generation.  
 
In the case of the Slow Transition Scenario, the results showed that industrial 
consumers would experience an involuntary interruption of 33% (13 mcm/d) of their 
average daily demand in the event of the loss of the Ukraine transit capacity. The gas 
supply shortage in GB limited the operation of gas-fired generation. As a result, 
imported electricity via cross-border interconnectors compensates for the reduction in 
gas-fired generation in the electricity network. 
 
6.1.3 Investments options to increase security of gas supply in GB  
A case study conducted to examine the impact of the loss of Ukraine transit capacity 
on the GB gas and electricity networks showed that large industrial and commercial 
customers in GB would experience some unserved gas demand when the supply 
disruption occurred over prolonged duration of cold winter condition. As a result, six 
mitigation options were examined to improve security of gas supply to GB.  
 
Chapter 6                                                                                                                                 Conclusion    
  
 
 
102 
 
  
 A Base Case was defined as the Loss of Ukraine transit capacity in the Slow Transition 
Scenario. The six mitigation options were modelled using the EGN-CGEN model to 
determine the volume of unserved gas demand, cost of unserved gas demand and the 
operational cost of the GB gas and electricity network. 
 
 A cost-benefit analysis was used to rank the mitigation options in order of increasing 
net benefit. The net benefit was calculated as the net present value (NPV) of the cost 
of reducing unserved gas demand in GB gas network. The results showed that Nord 
Stream Case eliminated unserved gas demand in GB and provided the highest net 
benefit (NPV of £1.03 billion) at no investment cost to GB consumers. Consequently, 
the EU projects aimed at the diversifying supply source and supply routes will provide 
indirect benefit to improving security of gas supply in GB.  
 
It was shown that Additional Storage Case significantly reduced the level of unserved 
gas demand in GB gas network by 95% at a positive NPV of £430 million. 
Nevertheless, this mitigation option provided the least net benefit to justify its cost.  
The result showed that interruptible demand contracts with large industrial and 
commercial customers would improve security of gas supply in GB and provide 
significant economic benefit to the GB gas consumers. 
 
The impact of the mitigation options on the operation of the electricity network was 
examined through the operation of the gas-fired generators. It was shown that when 
large volumes of low cost gas were supplied to CCGTs, gas-fired generation displaced   
electricity generated by other expensive generators leading to a reduction in the 
operational cost of the electricity network.  
 
6.2 Future Work  
Recommendations for further work are grouped into the following areas:  
The European gas network model presented in this study comprises all the relevant 
components of the gas network. However, it lacks a detailed representation of the 
pressure-flow relationship in pipeline operation. Therefore, a detailed technical model 
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of the European gas network can be investigated to provide accurate analysis of gas 
flow and linepack management along cross-border interconnectors in Europe.  
 
In conventional gas network operation, future gas demand is uncertain as it is affected 
by several factors that have stochastic profiles such weather conditions and consumer 
behaviour. In this study, a perfect foresight assumption was applied to the EGN-CGEN 
optimisation model. The perfect foresight model assumes that the system operator has 
perfect information of the daily gas demand and gas supplies available over the time 
horizon.  A stochastic modelling approach would result in a more accurate analysis of 
the effect of security of supply risks on integrated gas and electricity networks. 
 
In this study, the scope of energy storage was limited to pumped storage in GB 
electricity network as the 2015 FES showed a limited contribution of other. However, 
other energy storage technologies such as grid-scale battery energy storage systems 
(BESS) are expected to play a key role in meeting peak demand as it becomes cost-
competitive with other competing flexible generation technologies. In addition, active 
management of customers’ electricity demand is anticipated to minimise peak demand 
and improve system balancing. The impact of BESS and demand side response on the 
utilisation of electricity interconnectors and gas-fired generation in the GB gas and 
electricity network should be investigated.  
 
A large penetration of variable renewable generation on the European electricity 
network is expected to increase flexible gas demand in the European gas network. 
Therefore, a detailed model of an integrated European gas and electricity model that 
considers variability of renewable generation is required to analyse the impact of gas 
supply disruption on the security of the gas and electricity supply across Europe.  
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8. Appendix A 
Table A.1 List of countries and their abbreviations  
 
Country Code 
Algeria  DZ 
Austria AT 
Azerbaijan AZ 
Belarus BY 
Belgium BE 
Bosnia and Herzegovina BA 
Bulgaria BG 
Croatia HR 
Czech Republic CZ 
Denmark DK 
Estonia EE 
Finland FI 
France FR 
Germany DE 
Greece GR 
Hungary HU 
Ireland IE 
Italy IT 
Latvia LV 
Libya LY 
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Lithuania LT 
Iran IR 
Luxembourg  LU 
Macedonia MK 
Netherlands NL 
Norway NO 
Poland PL 
Portugal PT 
Romania RO 
Russia-Kaliningrad RK 
Russian Federation RU 
Serbia RS 
Slovakia  SK 
Slovenia SI 
Spain ES 
Sweden SE 
Switzerland CH 
Turkey TR 
Ukraine UA 
United Kingdom UK 
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9.Appendix B 
Input data for the European Gas Network Model  
Table B.1. Reference Demand Case – Winter 2015 Demand for European Countries 
[13] 
Country 
 
Average monthly demand (mcm/d) Peak day 
Demand 
(mcm/d) Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
Austria  29 33 41 43 41 33 76 
Belgium  45 61 87 76 70 67 141 
Bosnia  1 2 2 2 2 2 3 
Bulgaria 8 10 13 14 13 12 17 
Croatia 10 11 13 12 13 11 12 
Czech 
Republic 
25 31 44 46 44 34 73 
Denmark 9 11 15 16 16 13 25 
Estonia  1 2 3 4 5 5 5 
Finland  12 13 16 16 17 14 23 
France  105 169 226 251 225 181 419 
Germany 214 247 327 331 320 256 469 
Greece 14 14 15 16 16 15 22 
Hungary  30 37 50 53 51 39 89 
Ireland 13 16 18 18 16 16 25 
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Italy 212 268 340 356 339 286 486 
Latvia 4 5 7 8 8 6 11 
Lithuania 8 9 11 12 12 10 17 
 
Country Average monthly demand (mcm/d) Peak day 
demand   
(mcm/d) Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
Luxembourg 4 4 5 5 5 4 7 
Macedonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 108 127 172 185 160 112 416 
Poland  51 55 71 74 72 61 85 
Portugal 14 14 14 14 16 15 28 
Romania  35 40 50 47 52 45 70 
Serbia  7 9 11 12 12 10 13 
Slovakia  16 18 19 27 28 18 37 
Slovenia 3 3 4 4 4 3 6 
Spain 103 118 126 128 128 113 205 
Sweden 5 5 7 7 7 6 9 
Switzerland 6 10 13 15 13 11 20 
Turkey  118 128 162 172 166 152 200 
United 
Kingdom 
201 262 330 313 292 262 487 
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Table B.2. High Demand Case – Winter 2015 Demand for European Countries [13] 
Country Average monthly demand (mcm/d) 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
Austria  35 40 49 52 49 40 
Belgium  54 73 104 91 84 80 
Bosnia  1 2 2 2 2 2 
Bulgaria 10 12 16 17 16 14 
Croatia 12 13 16 14 16 13 
Czech 
Republic 
30 37 53 55 53 41 
Denmark 11 13 18 19 19 16 
Estonia  1 2 4 5 6 6 
Finland  14 16 19 19 20 17 
France  126 203 271 301 270 217 
Germany 257 296 392 397 384 307 
Greece 17 17 18 19 19 18 
Hungary  36 44 60 64 61 47 
Ireland 16 19 22 22 19 19 
Italy 254 322 408 427 407 343 
Latvia 5 6 8 10 10 7 
Lithuania 10 11 13 14 14 12 
Luxembourg 5 5 6 6 6 5 
Macedonia 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Netherlands 130 152 206 222 192 134 
Poland  61 66 85 89 86 73 
Portugal 17 17 17 17 19 18 
Romania  42 48 60 56 62 54 
Serbia  8 11 13 14 14 12 
Luxembourg 5 5 6 6 6 5 
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Country Average monthly demand (mcm/d) 
Oct Nov Dec Jan Feb Mar 
Netherlands 108 127 172 185 160 112 
Poland  51 55 71 74 72 61 
Portugal 14 14 14 14 16 15 
Romania  35 40 50 47 52 45 
Serbia  7 9 11 12 12 10 
Slovakia  16 18 19 27 28 18 
Slovenia 3 3 4 4 4 3 
Spain 103 118 126 128 128 113 
Sweden 5 5 7 7 7 6 
Switzerland 6 10 13 15 13 11 
Turkey  118 128 162 172 166 152 
United 
Kingdom 
201 262 330 313 292 262 
 
 
Table B.3. European Natural Gas Production Capacities and Cost  [65] 
 
Country Maximum supply 
(mcm/d) 
Production Cost 
(€/tcm) 
Austria  5 164 
Bulgaria  2 141 
Croatia  5 124 
Denmark  16 88 
Germany  29 164 
Hungary  7 130 
Italy  22 164 
Netherlands  450 152 
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Poland  10 160 
Romania  29 160 
United Kingdom 142 160 
 
Table B.4. European Gas Supply Capacities from Imported Sources and Cost [13],[1] 
 
Country Maximum supply 
(mcm/d) 
Production Cost 
(€/cm) 
Russia  500 0.1 
Norway  330 0.15 
Algeria 111.4 0.02 
Libya  30 0.09 
LNG  355 0.18 
 
Table B.5. LNG regasification capacities[141] 
 
Country LNG regasification capacity (mcm/d) 
Belgium 40.8 
France 65 
Greece 18 
Italy 35.4 
Netherlands 32.4 
Portugal 32.4 
Spain 164.7 
Sweden 1.78 
Turkey 38 
United Kingdom 134 
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Table B.6.  European Gas Storage Capacities   
 
Country  Working gas 
volume (mcm) 
Max withdrawal 
rate (mcm/d) 
Max injection 
rate (mcm/d) 
Austria  7451 86 70 
Belgium  700 15 8 
Bulgaria  550 4 4 
Croatia  550 4 4 
Czech Republic  3497 57 41 
Denmark  1025 18 8 
France  12920 341 163 
Germany  21822 535 294 
Hungary 6330 82 47 
Ireland  230 6 5 
Italy  16673 290 137 
Latvia  2820 31 12 
Netherlands  5278 216 59 
Poland  177 33 20 
Portugal  177 7 3 
Romania  3100 24 30 
Serbia  450 5 4 
Slovakia  3020 38 23 
Spain  4103 32 23 
Sweden  8.5 1 0 
Turkey  2655 20 18 
United Kingdom 4504 121 82 
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Table B.7. Maximum cross-border capacities of European gas interconnectors 
 
Linking Countries  Maximum cross border capacity (mcm/d) 
From (A) To (B) Forward flow (A-B) Reverse flow (B-A) 
Austria  Germany 35.27 30.52 
Austria Hungary  11.64  
Austria Italy 103.27 17.06 
Austria Slovakia 3.27 147.45 
Austria Slovenia  10.28  
Belarus  Lithuania 25.55  
Belarus  Poland  100.39  
Belgium France 74.55  
Belgium Germany 27.25 35.82 
Belgium  Luxembourg 4.36  
Belgium  Netherlands 35.45 109.10 
Belgium  United 
Kingdom 
73.18 56.69 
Bulgaria Greece 12.00  
Bulgaria  Macedonia 2.98  
Bulgaria Turkey 42.47 3.50 
Czech Republic Germany 128.12 119.76 
Czech Republic Poland 1.36  
Czech Republic  Slovakia 19.00 42.68 
Denmark Germany 2.87 1.55 
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Denmark Sweden 6.55  
France Spain 15.00 15.00 
France Switzerland  20.27  
Germany France 55.60  
Germany  Luxembourg 2.34  
Germany Netherland 37.92 164.79 
Germany Poland 3.09 84.64 
Hungary Croatia 6.91  
Hungary Romania 4.55  
Hungary  Serbia 12.45  
Ireland  United 
Kingdom 
0.00 32.09 
Italy  Slovenia 2.55  
Italy Switzerland   57.82 
Latvia Estonia 7.09  
Latvia Lithuania 5.62 5.62 
Libya  Italy 31.73  
Lithuania  Russia 
Kaliningrad 
10.30  
Algeria Spain 56.45  
Netherland  United 
Kingdom 
42.57  
Norway Belgium 53.28  
Norway France 51.82  
Norway Germany 101.38  
Norway Netherland  107.06  
Norway United 
Kingdom 
115.00  
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Portugal Spain 10.27 17.36 
 
Linking Countries  Maximum cross border capacity (mcm/d) 
From  
(A) 
To  
(B) 
Forward flow (A-
B) 
Reverse flow (B-A) 
Romania Bulgaria  67.00  
Russia  Estonia 4.02  
Russia Finland 20.45  
Russia Germany 85.70  
Russia Latvia 15.00  
Slovenia Croatia 4.82  
Algeria Italy 94.00  
Turkey Greece 5.24  
Ukraine  Hungary 68.18  
Ukraine Poland 15.75  
Ukraine Romania 80.72  
Ukraine Slovakia 219.24  
Russia Ukraine 389.04  
Russia  Estonia 4.02  
Russia Finland 20.46  
Russia Germany 85.70  
Russia Latvia 15.00  
Russia Ukraine 389.04  
Russia Belarus 90.41  
Germany  Switzerland 49.15  
Iran Turkey 54.65  
Azerbaijan Turkey 54.79  
Russia Turkey 43.89  
Serbia Bosnia 2.00  
Iran Turkey 54.65  
Azerbaijan Turkey 54.79  
Russia Turkey 43.89  
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10.Appendix C 
Linear approximation of storage constraints   
The volume of gas withdrawn from or injected into a storage facility varies with the 
current storage level. Withdrawal rates are highest when the storage is full while 
injection rate is highest when the storage facility is empty because of the pressure level 
in the storage. This non-linear relationship is expressed as (Thompson et al, 2009): 
 𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑜𝑢𝑡_𝑚𝑥 = 𝐾1
𝑜𝑢𝑡 ∗ √𝑆𝑠,𝑡    ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C.1 
 
 𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑥 = 𝐾1
𝑖𝑛 ∗ √𝑆𝑠,𝑡    ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C.2 
 
  𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛_𝑚𝑥 = 𝐾1
𝑖𝑛 ∗  √
1
𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛+𝑆𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 + 𝐾2
𝑖𝑛       ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C.3 
 
where 𝐾1
𝑜𝑢𝑡, 𝐾1
𝑖𝑛and  𝐾2
𝑖𝑛are factors that describe the features of the storage 
facility, 𝑆𝑠
𝑏𝑎𝑠𝑒 is the volume of cushion gas at facility s (mcm). However linear 
approximations were derived the non-linear storage constraints. 
 
The convex gas withdrawal function in equation C.1 is represented by the piecewise 
linear curve as shown in Figure C.1. 
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Figure C.1 Piecewise linearization of the withdrawal rate of a storage facility 
 
 Here different withdrawal rates ( 𝑊1…,𝑊𝑛) correspond to different storage levels 
(𝑋1…, 𝑋𝑛). The linear approximation of the withdrawal rate is given by Equation C.4.  
 𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 ≤ 
𝑊𝑠,𝑛+1 −𝑊𝑠,𝑛
𝑋𝑠,𝑛+1 − 𝑋𝑠,𝑛
 𝑆𝑖,𝑡 −
𝑊𝑠,𝑛+1 −𝑊𝑠,𝑛
𝑋𝑠,𝑛+1 − 𝑋𝑠,𝑛
𝑋𝑠,𝑛     ∀𝑠, 𝑡 C.4 
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Figure C1.2 Piecewise linearization of the injection rate of a storage facility 
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On the other hand, Figure C1.2 shows the injection rate is a non-convex function of 
storage level.  The special ordered sets of type 2 (SOS2) variables are used for the 
piecewise linear approximation of the non-convex function in equation (3.11).  
Let ( 𝐼1…, 𝐼𝑛) represent set of injection rate corresponding to a set of breakpoints  
 ( 𝑋1…, 𝑋𝑛).  The   SOS2 variables (Hn) are used to form a convex combination of two 
of the points such that only two adjacent variables 𝐻𝑛−1 and 𝐻𝑛+1 can be non-zero if 
𝐻𝑛 is zero. The linear approximation of the storage injection rate and storage level is 
given by Equations C1.3 and C1.4 [142]. 
 
 𝑆𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛 ≤ ∑ 𝐻𝑛,𝑠,𝑡𝑛 ∗  𝐼𝑛,𝑠 ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C1.3 
 
 𝑆𝑠,𝑡 ≤ ∑ 𝐻𝑛,𝑠,𝑡𝑛 ∗  𝑋𝑛,𝑠           ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C1.4 
 
 ∑ 𝐻𝑠,𝑡,𝑦𝑦 =  1          ∀𝑠, 𝑡       C1.5 
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11.Appendix D 
The Combined Gas and Electricity Network Model (CGEN) 
The combined gas and electricity network model (CGEN) is a multi-time period 
optimisation modelling tool used to examine the interaction of gas and electricity 
networks as an integrated system. The CGEN model is formulated as a non-linear 
programming problem and solved using Fico Xpress optimization suite.  
 D1. CGEN Objective Function  
The objective function minimises the total operational cost of the integrated gas and 
electricity network Equation (D.1) while meeting the gas and electricity demand. The 
operational cost including costs of gas supplies, storage operation, electricity 
generation and costs of unserved gas and electricity demand.   
Minimise total operational cost (£):  
 
∑𝑡𝑠
𝑡
× 
{
 
 
 
 
∑𝐶𝑎,𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑄𝑎,𝑡
𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝
𝑎⏟        
𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑠𝑢𝑝𝑝𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠
+∑(𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑  𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑤𝑑 − 𝐶𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗𝑄𝑠,𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑗
)
𝑠⏟                
𝑠𝑡𝑜𝑟𝑎𝑔𝑒 𝑜𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ ∑𝐶𝑡
𝑠𝑝𝜕𝐿𝑃𝑏,𝑡
𝑏⏟        
𝑐ℎ𝑎𝑛𝑔𝑒 𝑖𝑛 𝑙𝑖𝑛𝑒𝑝𝑎𝑐𝑘
+ ∑𝐶𝑔
𝑔𝑒𝑛
𝑔
 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 
⏟        
 
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑔𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛
+ ∑𝐶𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑖
𝑄𝑖,𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑  
⏟              
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑔𝑎𝑠 𝑑𝑒𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑑
+  ∑𝐶𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑗
 𝑄𝑗,𝑡
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
⏟              
𝑢𝑛𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑒𝑑 𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 𝑒𝑛𝑒𝑟𝑔𝑦 }
 
 
 
 
 
 
D.1
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D2. Gas Network  
The key components of a gas transmission network were modelling including 
pipelines, compressors, supply terminals and storage facilities.  
D2.1 Gas pipelines 
The gas flow rate is in a pipe is determined by the pressure difference between 
upstream and downstream nodes. The gas flow is assumed to be one-dimensional as 
the variation of gas properties along the radius of a pipe is negligible compared with 
the changes along the streamline direction.  
The assumptions for this one-dimensional flow are [50] and [13]: 
 the cross-sectional area changes slowly along the path of the stream of gas; 
 the radius of curvature of the pipe is large compared with its diameter; 
 temperature and velocity profiles are approximately constant along the pipe; 
 the pipe is horizontal. 
 
The gas flow along a pipe can be described by the continuity equation in Eq. (D.2) and 
the momentum equation Eq. (D.3) [50]. 
 𝜕𝑄
𝜕𝑥
= −
𝐴
𝜌𝑍𝑅𝑇
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑡
    D.2 
          
where 
x
Q


 is change in flow due to changes in distance, A  is pipe cross sectional 
area,  is gas density, Z  is Gas compressibility, R  is Gas constant, T  is 
temperature, and 
t
p


 is change of pressure over time. 
 𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
= −
𝜕 (𝑝𝑣)
𝜕𝑡
−
𝜕(𝑝𝑣)2
𝜕𝑥
 −
2𝑓𝜌𝑣2
𝐷
  
D.3 
 
where 
𝜕𝑝
𝜕𝑥
 is change of pressure due to changes in distance, 𝑣 is gas velocity through a 
pipe, is 𝑓 friction factor,  𝐷 is pipe diameter. 
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A finite difference scheme is used to convert the original partial differential Equations. 
(D.2) and (D.3) into ordinary differential equations in Equations (D.4) and (D.5)[143] 
 𝑄𝑋,𝑇
𝑛 − 𝑄𝑇
𝑛
∆𝑥
= −
𝐴
𝜌𝑛𝑍𝑅𝑇
(𝑝𝑇
𝑎𝑣 − 𝑝𝑎𝑣)
∆𝑡
   D.4 
 
 𝑝𝑋𝑇 − 𝑝𝑇
∆𝑥
= −
2𝑍𝑅𝑇𝑓( 𝜌𝑛)2(𝑄𝑇
𝑛,𝑎𝑣) |𝑄𝑇
𝑛,𝑎𝑣|
𝐴2𝐷𝑝𝑇
𝑎𝑣    
D.5 
 
 Linepack modelling 
The linepack of a pipe is the volume of gas stored in a pipe and an important factor 
that determines the ability to supply gas to demand nodes i.e. packing more gas in the 
pipe allows fluctuations in demand to be met as gas supply from a distant source will 
take time (typically hours) to reach the intended destination[67].  
A combination of the gas equation of state (Eq. D.6) and Boyle’s law (Eq. D.7) is used 
to calculate the linepack of a pipe [50]: 
 𝑍𝑅 = −
𝑝𝑛
𝜌𝑛𝑇𝑛
= 
𝑝
𝜌𝑇
 D.6 
 
 𝑝𝑎𝑣𝑉 = 𝑝𝑛𝑉𝑛  
D.7 
 
 𝐿𝑃 = 𝑉𝑛 =
𝑝𝐴𝑉𝑉
𝜌𝑛𝑍𝑅 𝑇𝑛
 D.8 
 
Equation D.8 is suitable for calculating the volume of gas in a pipe when the gas flow 
is in steady state. This illustrates that the pipe linepack is proportional to the average 
pressure in the pipe section, therefore, increasing the average pressure of the pipe will 
increase the linepack and vice versa. 
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Under dynamic situations, the gas flow into and out of a pipe fluctuates with changing 
supply and demand. According to the Law of conservation of mass, the change of total 
gas volume is equal to the difference between the flow into and out of the pipe. Thus, 
we have: 
 𝐿𝑃(𝑡) = 𝐿𝑃0 + ∫ (𝑄𝑛 − 𝑄𝑛,𝑋)𝑑𝑡
𝑡
0
  D.9 
 
where, 𝐿𝑃0 is the initial gas stored in the pipe and is calculated by Eq. (D.9) in the 
steady state condition. 
 Gas compressors 
Compressors are used to boost the pressure lost through friction as gas flow along 
pipes in the transmission network.  The power required from the compressor prime-
mover is calculated by Eq. (D.10). 
 
𝑃𝑐 = 
𝑄𝑐
𝑛 𝛼
𝜂𝑐 (𝛼−1)
[(
𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑛
)
𝛼−1
𝛼
− 1]  
D.10 
 
where 𝑃𝑐 is power consumption by compressor 𝑐 , 𝑄𝑐
𝑛 is gas flow through compressor 
𝑐, in standard condition, 𝑐 is polytropic exponent, 𝜂𝑐  is efficiency of compressor 𝑐, 
𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡 is pressure of gas from a compressor, and 𝑝𝑖𝑛 is pressure of gas into a compressor. 
In practice, the performance of a compressor is constrained by the following equations: 
 1 ≤
𝑝𝑜𝑢𝑡
𝑝𝑖𝑛
≤ 𝑐𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑥  D.11 
 
where cpr  is the compressor pressure ratio. 
 𝑄𝑐
𝑛 ≤ 𝑄𝑐
𝑛,𝑚𝑎𝑥
  D.12 
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 𝑝𝑐 ≤ 𝑝𝑐
𝑚𝑎𝑥  D.13 
 
The amount of gas tapped by the compressor is given by [144]: 
 𝜏𝑐,𝑡 ≤ 𝛽𝑃𝑐,𝑡  
D.14 
 
where 𝜏𝑐,𝑡is amount of gas tapped by a compressor, and 𝛽 is gas turbine fuel rate 
coefficient of a compressor. 
 
Gas Storage 
Gas storage facilities are modelled based on their operational characteristics such as 
working gas volume, withdrawal rate, and injection rate and cushion gas. The 
operational characteristics of storage facilities have been introduced in section 3.4.2. 
The gas storage constraints is expressed by equations (3.6) – (3.11). 
However, non-linear storage constraints are solved using sequential linear 
programming  
 Gas network constraints  
At each node in the gas network pressure and gas flow balance constrains are applied. 
For each time step, total gas flow into each node (gas supply and storage withdrawal) 
is equal to total gas outflow from the node (gas demand, gas storage injection, 
compressor fuel consumption): 
 
𝑀𝑢,𝑎𝑄𝑎 +𝑀𝑢,𝑝𝑄𝑝 +𝑀𝑢,𝑐𝑄𝑐 − 𝑀𝑢,𝑐𝜏
𝑐 + 𝑀𝑢,𝑠𝑄𝑠
𝑠
= 𝑀𝑢,𝑑(𝑄
𝑑𝑒𝑚 − 𝑄𝑔𝑎𝑠𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑) 
D.15 
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where 𝑀𝑢,𝑎𝑄𝑎 is node-terminal incidence matrix, 𝑀𝑢,𝑝 is node-pipe flow incidence 
matrix, 𝑀𝑢,𝑐 is node –compressor incidence matrix, 𝑀𝑢,𝑠 is node–storage incidence 
matrix, 𝑀𝑢,𝑑 is node-load incidence matrix. 
 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 ≤ 𝑝 ≤ 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥  D.16 
 
 
where 𝑝𝑚𝑖𝑛 and 𝑝𝑚𝑎𝑥 are the lower and upper pressure bounds for each pipe in the gas 
network. 
D3. Electricity Network  
The electricity network is simplified as a Direct Current (DC) power model. The 
network consists of mainly generators and transmission lines. The DC power flow 
formulation reduces computational complexities to obtain MW power flows in each 
individual line. The DC power flow model is based on the following assumptions: 
i. the line resistance in a high voltage transmission system is very much smaller 
when compared to line reactance, such that resistance and system losses can be 
neglected 
ii. the phase voltage angle difference of a high voltage line is very small 
iii. the bus voltage per unit is close to nominal value (~1.0 p.u). 
 Power balance constraint  
For each time step the power balance equations ensures that total generation is equal 
to total demand less load shedding:  
 ∑ 𝑃𝑔,𝑡𝑔 = ∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑑𝑒𝑚
𝑗 − ∑ 𝑃𝑗,𝑡
𝑒𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑠ℎ𝑒𝑑
𝑗   
D.17 
    
where P tg ,  is power output of generation unit g at time t, P
dem
tj ,
is electricity demand 
at bus j and time t, and P
elecshed
tj ,
 is unserved electricity at bus j and time t.  
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 Electricity Network Constraints 
The power schedule is kept within the physical limits of the generating units as shown 
in Equation (4.18): 
 𝑃𝑔
𝑔𝑒𝑛(min)
 ≤ 𝑃𝑔,𝑡
𝑔𝑒𝑛 ≤ 𝑃𝑔
𝑔𝑒𝑛(𝑚𝑎𝑥)
  D.18 
             
 Power transmission 
Power transmission along a line is constrained by maximum transmission capacity of 
the line. 
 
where 𝑃𝑙,𝑡 is electrical power transmitted through line l. 
 
D4. Linkage between gas and electricity network 
 Gas turbine generators provide the linkage between gas and electricity networks. They 
are regarded as energy converters between these two networks. For the gas network, 
the gas turbine was considered as a gas load. Its value depends on the power flow in 
the electricity network. In the electricity network, the gas turbine generator is a source. 
The relationship between the gas fuel flow and the real electrical power generated is 
expressed as: 
 
 𝑃𝑔,𝑡 = 𝜂𝑔𝑄𝑔,𝑡𝐻  
D.20 
 
where 𝜂𝑔is thermal efficiency of generator, 𝑄𝑔,𝑡 is gas consumption by generator g
at time t, and is 𝐻  heat value of natural gas. 
 
 
𝑃𝑙,𝑡  ≤ 𝑃𝑙
𝑚𝑎𝑥  D.19 
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12.Appendix E 
GB Gas and Electricity Networks Data 
Table E.1.  GB Gas Terminals 
 
Gas terminal  Maximum capacities 
St.Fergus 84 
Teeside  30 
Easington 78 
Barrow 4 
Burton 3 
Theddletrope 4.9 
Bacton 150 
Isle of Grain 65 
Milford Haven  95 
 
Table E.2. Maximum Gas Supply Available to GB and Supply Costs  
 
Supply source Maximum supply 
available to GB (mcm/d) 
Supply cost (£/tcm) 
Domestic production   55.37 51 
Norway  80 115 
*LNG 123 145 
*Continental Supplies 75 Dependent on the gas 
price in the European 
gas network  
*Maximum LNG and Continental Supplies available to GB depends on gas demand and supply balance 
in the European gas network.  
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Table E.3 Cost of unserved gas demand for different gas consumer categories[30][120] 
[134] 
 
Disconnection 
merit order 
Consumer Categories Capacity 
Cost of 
unserved gas 
demand 
1 Large Industrial &Commercial 
gas consumers  
49.42 
mcm/d 
£4.1 6 /cm 
2 Electricity Generation (CCGT)  240 GWh/d £4/kWh 
3 Domestic gas 113.3 
mcm/d 
*£50/cm 
*The cost of unserved gas demand for domestic gas is significantly large to ensure that the disconnection of domestic gas 
supply is considered as the last option. 
 
 
Table E.4. Installed GB Power Generation Data - Reference Scenario (GW) 
 
Busbar Nuclear 
Gas-
fired 
Biomass/ 
Coal CCS 
Wind Interconnector 
Hydro/ 
Pumped Hydro 
Others 
1 - 1.2 0.3 5.2 1 1.6 1 
2 - - 0.6 6.7 1.4 - - 
3 - - - - - 0.5 - 
4 - - - - - 0.4 - 
5 - 0.7 0.8 1 - 0.4 - 
6 0.9 0.1 0.6 7.3 - 0.3 0.9 
7 1.2 2.6 0.3 4.4 - - - 
8 - - - 0 - - - 
9 2.4 3.8 0.5 7.3 0.9 2 - 
10 - 6.6 1.8 3.6 - - - 
11 - - - - - - - 
12 - 3 0.8 1.7 - - 0.5 
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13 - 2 - 7.5 - - - 
14 - 3.2 3.1 1.7 2 - 1.4 
15 0.9 5.9 - 2.3 - - 1.4 
16 5.2 9.8 - 2.3 2 - 2.1 
Total 10.6 38.9 8.8 51 7.3 2 5.15 
 
Table E.5. Installed GB Power Generation Data - Slow Transition Scenario (GW) 
 
Busbar 
Nuclear Gas-
fired 
Biomass/ 
Coal 
CCS 
Wind Interconnector Hydro/ 
Pumped 
Hydro 
Others 
1 - 1.2 0.3 4.1 1 1.6 1 
2 - - 0.6 5.33 1.4 - - 
3 - - - - - 0.5 - 
4 - - - - - 0.4 - 
5 - 0.7 0.8 0.82 - 0.4 - 
6 0.9 0.1 0.6 5.74 - 0.3 0.9 
7 1.2 2.6 0.3 3.28 - - - 
8 - - - - - - - 
9 2.4 3.8 0.5 5.74 0.9 2 - 
10 - 6.6 1.8 2.87 - - - 
11 - - - - - - - 
12 - 3 0.8 1.23 - - 0.5 
13 - 2 - 6.15 - - - 
14 - 3.2 3.1 1.23 2 - 1.4 
15 0.9 5.9 - 2.05 - - 1.4 
16 5.2 9.8 - 2.05 2 - 2.1 
Total 10.6 38.9 8.8 40.6 7.3 2 5.15 
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E.6. GB Transmission line capacities  
 
GB transmission 
boundaries  
Maximum transmission 
capacities (MW) 
TB1 1600 
TB2 2800 
TB3 3000 
TB4 3300 
TB5 5150 
TB6 7800 
TB7 7500 
TB8 1661 
TB9 3842 
TB10 10603 
TB11 3908 
TB12 5215 
TB13 11551 
TB14 6174 
TB15 8423 
 
E.7. GB Power Generation Cost  
Generator Generation cost (£/MWh) 
Nuclear  
 
11.63 
CCGT/OGCT/GAS 
 
Dependent on gas price 
Coal 
 
20.87 
Biomass 50.87 
Dual fuel 70 
Pumped storage 60 
Interconnector  
 
83.75 
Hydro  
 
0 (must run) 
Wind  
 
0 (must run) 
 
 
